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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
v.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.

Case No: 95-44-02034 DA
Judge:
Ray M. Harding, Jr.

Petitioner, CRAIG JACK HARRIS, by and through counsel, Martin & Nelson, PC, files
this MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as follows:
ISSUES
Respondent stands in defiance of the Orders of this Court. Respondent has taken and
concealed substantial personal property in violation of the Court's Order. Respondent provided
false information to the Court, resulting in her acquisition of more than $25,000.00 over and above
that granted in the Court's Order. Respondent has refused to return any property wrongfully
acquired or taken and has refused to recognize Craig's rights. Bonnie stands in open defiance of
the Orders of this Court.

i

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bonnie's unlawful taking of property in violation of Court's Order—
1.

At Bonnie's request the parties executed a STIPULATION AS TO ACCOUNTING

AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES, dated February 9, 1998. A copy of that Stipulation is
attached hereto as "Exhibit A."
2.

Pursuant to that Stipulation the Court issued its February 23, 1998 ORDER Re:

THE ACCOUNTING AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES. A copy of that Order is attached
hereto as "Exhibit B." That Order states that:
All questions and disputes related to accounting and determination of all property,
both real and personal, [and] values shall be submitted to the firm of NormanLoebbecke Associates.
Each of the parties shall provide Norman-Loebbecke Associates with the facts
which each believes is material to the identification of property, [and] the
underlying facts claimed as to such property. Both parties shall fully cooperate in
providing Norman-Loebbecke Associates with access to any and all information
which said firm shall request.
Should there be any dispute as to any such matters the question may be brought
before the Court by way of motion for an appropriate order.
3.

Trial of the matter was held in 1999 on August 16-17, September 23, and on

October 12.
4.

Appearing before the Court at trial was Brad Townsend, CPA, with the firm of

Norman/Loebbecke.

Based upon all information received from both parties, Mr. Townsend

testified and the Court admitted into evidence a document from Mr. Townsend titled "Harris v.
Harris, Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution." The Court accepted that document as a
listing of all assets, incorporating that document into its Findings of Fact. A copy of that document
is attached hereto as "Exhibit C."
5.

Subsequent to the trial, the Court issued a number of Orders:

?

a) The Supplementary Decree of Divorce, filed November 29, 1999 (attached
hereto as "Exhibit D");
b) The Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed
April 4, 2000 (attached hereto as "Exhibit E"); and
c) The Court's Orders divided all property listed in Mr. Townsend's Report.
("Exhibit C")
6.

The Orders of the Court directed that Bonnie shall retain her personal property and

that Craig shall retain all his personal property.
7.

Paragraph 9 of the SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, filed November

29, 1999, ("Exhibit D") provided that:
The Respondent [Bonnie] is awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed
in Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman/Loebbecke Associates,
with the exception of the Signetics retirement which is to be divided under
Woodward as set forth above. [Emphasis added.]
8.

Real property listed in the Townsend Report included a large, three bay, double

garage-door, commercial sized storage building on a lot located only yards from the Harris home in
Pleasant Grove. Photographs of that lot and building are included herein as part of "Exhibit F."
9.

Craig, Bonnie and other family members all used the building for many years.

Boats and vehicles were stored therein along with personal property of Bonnie and of Craig, his
brother, his mother, Craig's two sons and others. That building was used by all as a large,
covered, secure storage and work space. The building also contained heavy commercial steel
shelving that had been purchased by AID Equipment, Inc. Mr. Townsend's report listed both the
building and some large, high value items of personal property stored therein as marital assets.1

1

Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 2, paragraph 6.
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10.

The storage building and all its contents have always been accessible to Bonnie.

Bonnie was awarded the building and some of its specific contents that she listed as marital assets
she wanted. The court awarded Bonnie all her personal property. Bonnie has had the storage
building in her possession and control. Yet, never, until long after the trial did she make her claim
against any of the unlisted personal property in that storage building.2
11.

In discussions prior to trial it had been decided that as to the storage building Craig

would keep his property and Bonnie would keep hers. They had lived there for many years and
both knew which property was theirs and which was not. That had all be discussed with the CPA.
12.

The last day of trial was October 12, 1999.

13.

Bonnie only first raised her claim against the entire contents of the storage building

in March of 2000. Yet, the fact that she had taken substantial amounts of personal property,
including property that she knew or must have known belonged to persons other than Craig, from
the building was admitted in a letter dated March 27, 2000. A copy of that letter is attached hereto
as "Exhibit G."
14.

On December 28, 1999, Craig had filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS. A copy of that document is attached hereto as "Exhibit H."
Hearing on that Motion came before this court on March 1, 2000. At that hearing the Court
received a stipulation as to the division of Craig's and Bonnie's personal property.
15.

During the hearing on March 1, 2000 the Court ordered that:3 (See "Exhibit I.")
I'm going to recess and direct the parties to meet together with Mr.
Townsend for the next forty-five minutes and attempt to identify the
ambiguities that you see in the Order and attempt to come up with
stipulated resolutions of those ambiguities. And I'm going to order you to
both be in good faith in trying to resolve this.

2

Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 2, paragraph 7.
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16.

During the recess, the parties agreed to the manner of division of the personal

property items in Craig's possession and items of personal property located in the storage building.
See Affidavit of Craig Harris, 10/17/00, attached hereto as "Exhibit J."

During the recess,

discussion occurred as follows:
a) Mr. Townsend said he had never received, nor had Bonnie ever provided, any
inventory or description of any miscellaneous personal property items located in
the storage building.
b) Bonnie had not previously made any claim against that property. She had never
made any claim that any of that property was marital property and had not
previously provided any list or inventory of the miscellaneous personal property
items to Mr. Townsend.
c) The Court Order was that Craig was to pay Bonnie five thousand dollars and
retain his personal property. The Court's Order stated that Craig and Bonnie
were to retain all of their own items of personal property.
d) Craig pointed out that he, his sons, his mother, his brother and Bonnie all had
miscellaneous items of personal property then located in the storage building.
e) Bonnie affirmed her claim that the Court Order was that she was given "all
remaining assets" not specifically awarded to Craig.
f) Bonnie said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his
personal property (bed, clothing, washer, dryer, personal items, etc.) that he
presently had in his apartment for five-thousand dollars ($5,000.00).
g) Bonnie also said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his
personal property that was located "in the bullet room" of the storage building
3

Transcript of Hearing, "Exhibit I," March 1, 2000, page 2, lines 6-11.
^

for five hundred dollars. Bonnie then said that she recently had a person come
over and look at the stuff in the storage building. Bonnie then emphatically said
that Craig was "getting a real deal" if she let him have the stuff only in the
"bullet room" for five times five-hundred dollars,
h) Craig argued that the Court Order had awarded Bonnie forty thousand dollars
(purchase price) of personal property, furniture, fixtures, and furnishings in the
home for a value of only eight thousand dollars,
i) Bonnie said that what she needed from the storage building was some tools that
she required to take care of the yard, including the house and the storage
building that had been awarded to her.
j) Finally it was agreed that Bonnie could take what tools she might need to take
care of the yard. She could take those items from the storage building and then
Craig would remove everything else to clean up the building for Bonnie's use
since the storage building had been awarded to her.
17.

4

The Judge came back to the bench and the following was read into the record:4
COURT:

Please, be seated. We're back on record in the Harris v. Harris
matter we have had a break here to allow parties to see what they can
stipulate to in terms of resolution of any perceived ambiguities. Mr.
Moody, has there been any resolution?

MOODY:

I think so. On the personal property (aside to Mr. Martin) - is that
agreeable then? On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take
what personal tools that she would like to have out of the shop by
the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have until that
weekend, I believe its the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the
possessions out of the shop. [Emphasis added.]

COURT:

Ok, and that will resolve the personal property?

Transcript of Hearing, "Exhibit I," page 5, lines 1-13.
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MOODY:

18.

Yes. And then he will agree to pay her $5,000.00 for the personal
property and he retains possession of all the personal property.

The Court asked Mr. Moody to prepare the Order, which is attached as "Exhibit

K."5 The Order was signed by the Court and filed on April 4, 2000. Paragraph two of the Order
provided that,
The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15, 2000 to
select and remove what personal property [personal tools] she desires to have from
the building located on the Pleasant Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the
remaining personal property he desires out of the building on or before March 30,
2000. Any personal property left in the building after March 30, 2000 shall be the
property of the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the Respondent
on or before April 4. 2000, for the personal property located in his personal
possession and from the personal property received from the building located on the
Pleasant Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot
to the Petitioner from March 16, through March 30, 2000 upon the Petitioner giving
Respondent 24 hour notice of the times in which he intends on removing the
property. [Emphasis added.]
19.

Only three days later, Bonnie took action in defiance of the Court's Order. On

March 4, 2000, Bonnie called the Pleasant Grove Police Department, claiming that the storage
building had been forcibly entered—burglarized some time between February 16th at 9:00 p.m. and
March 4th at 2:00 p.m. Bonnie reported Craig's son, Scott Harris, as the most likely suspect. A
copy of the Pleasant Grove Police Department Report, 03-04-00, case number 269335.A46, is
attached hereto as "Exhibit L." The investigating officer's report was that:
On the afternoon of 3-4-00 I responded to 692 Juniper for a report of a
burglary. I met with Bonnie Harris who owns a storage building at 725 Orchard.
She stated that someone had broken into her garage by pushing the garage door in,
breaking it off the track. [Emphasis added.]
20.

When Craig, acting under the Court's Order, went to the storage building between

March 15 and March 30 he discovered that the building had been completely cleaned out. With the

7

exception of one fishing tackle box and contents, large heavy gun safe, Scott Harris' Jeep and
other Utah registered and serial numbered items, Bonnie had removed everything except
miscellaneous trash.6
21.

A series of photographs of both the exterior and interior of the building as

discovered by Craig are attached hereto as "Exhibit F." The photographs depict the condition and
contents of the storage building.7
22.

It being noted that the garage doors bore the label of Martin Door Manufacturing in

Salt Lake City, the chief engineer for that company was contacted and agreed to inspect the site.
The photographs set out in "Exhibit F" were taken coincident with that inspection. From that
inspection, certain conclusions were made. See "Exhibit F." The expert opinion was:
That someone manually removed the interior lag screw with a wrench for the
apparent purpose of making it appear that the door had been breached. What I
observed appears to have been done by someone with access to the inside of the
building by keyed entry. I observed no evidence of forced entry. The observed
"breach" of the door could have only been done from inside the storage building.
23.

On March 20, Craig's counsel was informed that property had been removed in

violation of the Order of the Court. A telephone call was immediately placed to Bonnie's legal
counsel. A letter confirmed that telephone call. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit
M."
24.

Bonnie's legal counsel responded by letter dated March 27, 2000. A copy of that

letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit G." That letter stated that:
a) Bonnie had changed the locks on the storage building in November of 1999;
b) "Bonnie had not been in the shed since December, 1999, from the time she put
the padlock on the building until after the hearing on March 1, 2000;
5

Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Other Matters, "Exhibit K," filed April 4, 2000.
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c) Bonnie claimed now that the building had been burglarized some time after she
had changed the locks, listing twenty-seven (27) items Bonnie "noticed" were
"missing from the shed;"
d) Contrary to the Court's Order, Bonnie's counsel's claimed that all the items of
personal property in the storage building had been "awarded" to Bonnie;
e) Bonnie would only return part of the property she took from the storage
building only upon certain demands being met; and that
f) Bonnie would only return items belonging to third parties if they specifically
identified each item and writing and provided documents of ownership as
Bonnie may require.
25.

In accordance with the Court's Order, Craig went to the storage building with his

son, Scott, one afternoon following March 15th to remove the personal property that belonged to
him, Aid Equipment, Craig's mother, his brother and his two sons, Troy and Scott. When Craig
opened the door, he was stunned to see that everything had been removed. Not knowing what had
happened, Craig called the Pleasant Grove Police. After the police arrived, then Bonnie came over
from the house. Bonnie admitted that she had taken all the stuff. In fact, during the discussion
that followed Scott asked Bonnie why she had also taken everything she knew belonged to him.
Bonnie responded, saying "that there were so many people helping her take things that she didn't
know everything that was taken but that she had told them to just take everything."8
26.

An estimate of the value of personal property taken by Bonnie is now impossible to

compile because no prior inventory was made. Actual value of loss may double the estimates.
There were twenty-seven items of substantial value, estimated at $23,000.00, that Bonnie just
6

Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 5, paragraph 16.
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 5, paragraph 17.
8
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 5, paragraph 18.
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simply claimed were "missing".9 Craig had personally observed and he recalled that eighteen of
the "missing" items had been there just a few months earlier. In any event, in addition to the
missing items, from memory only, it is conservatively estimated that Bonnie took personal
property belonging to the following:10
a) Craig—valued at more than $4,600.00;
b) AID Equipment valued at $2,925.00;
c) Dick (Craig's Brother) valued at $3,734.00; and
d) Troy and Scott (Craig's Sons) valued at more than $8,500.00.
A copy of the memory inventories and estimated values provided by Craig are attached to Craig's
Affidavit, "Exhibit J."
Bonnie's took additional IRA money in violation of the Decree of Divorce—
27.

The SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, "Exhibit D" attached hereto,

reflects that the Court Findings were that Craig held interests in two retirement accounts:
a) The Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard, of value equal to or greater than
$36,923.00, net, after costs of sale and tax penalties ($65,000.00, gross market
value); and
b) The Prudential Securities UQ-R62840 Simple IRA, of value equal to or greater
than $2,666.00, net, after costs of sale and tax penalties ($4,500.00, gross
market value).
28.

The valuation date was January 29, 1999.11

9

Letter from Bonnie's legal counsel, dated March 27, 2000, "Exhibit I," page 5.
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 6, paragraph 20.
11
Supplementary Decree of Divorce, "Exhibit D," page 1-2.
10
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29.

The Order of the Court directed that Bonnie would keep her own IRA with Dean

Witter, valued at $48,918.00. The Court then awarded Bonnie both of Craig's IRA's, valued at a
combined total of $39,589.00.12
30.

During November of 1999, Craig spoke with Bonnie about the transfer of his

IRA's as Ordered. To Craig's surprise, Bonnie told him that her attorney was at that moment
working on papers to transfer $73,800.00 from Craig's two IRA accounts, "as ordered by the
court." At that time, Craig reminded Bonnie that the market value of Craig's IRA accounts on the
date Ordered by the Court was $39,589.00, net. Bonnie said that her attorney had told her that she
could get the $73,800.00. Bonnie said, "and that's what I'm going to get." The Prudential IRA
account Craig set up after the divorce was Account Number UQ-100296. That account was set up
after the divorce and was funded from Craig's separate funds he acquired and deposited after the
date of divorce.13
31.

AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW were entered until April 4, 2000. That final Order again recognized January 26, 1999 as
the valuation date of property.14
32.

During that interim time, Craig's automatic IRA retirement deposits had continued

to be made to his first Prudential account. To maintain a proper accounting for the separate funds
deposited after January 26, 1999, Craig opened an additional account at Prudential, Account
Number UQ-R82581, into which his separate personal funds earned after the divorce were
deposited.15
33.

Subsequently, in compliance with the Court's final Order, Craig instructed

Prudential to transfer Account Number UQ-R62840, the original IRA account, plus all accrued
12

Supplementary Decree of Divorce, "Exhibit D."
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 7, paragraph 26.
14
Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, "Exhibit E."
13
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earnings from January 26, 1999. By that time the original IRA account had increased in value to
$4,885.00.

That was the value that went to Bonnie when that account was transferred by

Prudential to Bonnie.16
34.

Bonnie had known that Craig had continued to make deposits to an ERA after the

Divorce. From what Bonnie said and how she acted, Craig continued to believe that there may be
some reconciliation.

Craig told Bonnie about both IRA accounts and the money still being

deposited.17
35.

At a subsequent evidentiary hearing held on May 31, 2000, Mr. Charles A.

Schultz, Bonnie's counsel, misled the Court when he accused Craig of fraudulently manipulating
and attempting to conceal the Prudential IRA accounts.

Craig has flatly denied any such

allegations. Mr. Schultz and Bonnie knew or must have known from their inquiry to Prudential
that Craig has established a second account after the divorce and that the second account contained
Craig's separate funds acquired after the divorce. Yet, based upon Schultz's allegations and intent
to mislead the Judge, the Court directed Mr. Schultz to prepare an ORDER ON CONTEMPT
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, which is attached as "Exhibit N." Paragraph 8 of that Order ordered
that,
The Prudential IRA, listed on Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce,
account # UQ-R62840, shall be provided and transferred to the Respondent, with
the money taken out and transferred to account # UQ-R2581 returned or
redeposited into account # UQ-R62840.
36.

The Court Order gave Craig twenty-one days to fully comply, setting a jail

sentencing day of June 21, 2000 at 10:30 a.m.18

15

Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," pages 7-8, paragraph 28.
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 8, paragraph 29.
17
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 8, paragraph 30.
18
Order on Contempt Evidentiary Hearing, page 5, paragraph 11.
16
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37.

Craig immediately took action to transfer all Prudential IRA accounts to Bonnie,

understanding that he may be permitted to bring a proper accounting before the Court at a later date
should Bonnie or her counsel wish to pursue the litigation yet even further.19
38.

Both prior to this final Order and after, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate

in or assist any court ordered transfer. Bonnie told Craig that she and her counsel were taking the
position that he had been Ordered to transfer all property and funds and that she had not been
ordered to help. In fact, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate in any manner to facilitate the
transfer. As an example, under IRS regulations, transfer of qualified retirement funds must be
made to a qualified account that Bonnie had previously established. But Bonnie refused to even
call Prudential to identify her own IRA account and ask that the money be transferred. She would
not assist Craig in completing transfer of property as ordered by the court. She just kept saying
that Craig had been ordered to do everything without her.20
39.

Craig even got a letter from Prudential that specifically stated that a request must be

made by "the receiving firm, accompanied by a Divorce Decree and appropriate signatures."
Bonnie just refused to sign any papers or even request that the funds be transferred to her
designated IRA account. A copy of that Prudential letter, dated April 28, 2000 is attached hereto as
"Exhibit O."
40.

Finally, in a letter dated June 5, 2000, Bonnie made it clear that Craig was to

complete all transfers totally by himself or go to jail on June 21. A copy of this letter is attached as
"Exhibit P."21
41.

That refusal to cooperate stood in defiance of paragraph 18 of the Court's previous

SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, "Exhibit D," which directed that,
19

Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 8, paragraph 33.
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 9, paragraph 37.
21
Letter from Charles A. Schultz, Attorney at Law, June 5, 2000, attached hereto as "Exhibit P."
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Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and
personal property division as ordered by the Court.
42.

Bonnie's

refusal

to

cooperate

was

also

evidenced

throughout

Craig's

CERTMCATE OF COMPLIANCE, page 2, paragraph 10; a letter from MONY Life Insurance
Company, dated June 14, 2000, and a letter dated June 8, 2000 from Bonnie's counsel.
43.

Those documents are part of Craig's Certificate of Compliance, dated June 14,

2000. That Certificate of Compliance is attached hereto as "Exhibit Q."
44.

From Craig's IRA accounts Bonnie took much more than the $2,666.00 allocated

to Bonnie by the Court. Bonnie actually took $4,885.00. Then by stratagem Bonnie manipulated
the Order of the Court, making false claims after trial, obtaining an additional $16,292.39 over and
above what the Court granted in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce. See accounting attached to
Craig's Affidavit in "Exhibit J."
Question of transfer of ownership of life insurance policy—
45.

The Findings of the Court were also that Craig's life insurance policy, MONY

Whole Life 1347-24-19W, had a value of $16,042.00.

The Court ordered that the policy be

transferred to Bonnie.22
46.

Given the time between the Divorce Decree and the final Order of the Court, Craig

had continued to pay premiums on that MONY life insurance policy as he had on the IRA.23
47.

Craig also continued to talk to Bonnie.

Craig and Bonnie discussed the life

insurance policy. Craig told Bonnie that he had paid more money on the policy.24
48.
22
23

The face amount of that life insurance policy was $150,000.00.25

Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, "Exhibit E," page 4, paragraph 9.
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 10, paragraph 44.
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49.

Having all such facts in mind Bonnie pressed the Court for an Order that Craig

transfer full present ownership to Bonnie.26
50.

Obtaining ownership of the policy, Bonnie told Craig that she had cashed in the

policy, receiving over $21,000.00 in exchange, thereby obtaining more than $4,958.00 over and
above the Court's order.27
51.

At the hearing on June 21, 2000, the Court accepted Craig's CERTIFICATE OF

COMPLIANCE that reflected that Craig no longer had any obligation to Bonnie. Craig had fully
complied and completed all required transfers.
52.

Over and above the additional funds that Craig had deposited to the IRA and life

insurance Bonnie also demanded an additional interest on all accounts and values of those accounts
from the Divorce date until the actual date of transfer.28 Bonnie's demand for such additional
interest amounted to a claim of $3,787.61.29
Question of transfer of ownership of other property—
53.

Through the Supplementary Decree of Divorce, included herewith as "Exhibit D"

the Court Ordered that30:
Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and
personal property division as ordered by the Court.
IRA Accounts:
54.

Bonnie refused to cooperate to effectuate the transfer of property.

Bonnie told

Craig that the Court didn't require that she do anything to assist the transfer. Bonnie said that
24

Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 10. paragraph 45.
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J,'* page 11, paragraph 46.
26
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 11, paragraph 47.
27
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 11, paragraph 48.
28
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 11, paragraph 50.
29
Letter from Schultz, dated June 5, 2000, "Exhibit P," page 2, paragraph 8.
25
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Craig had been "ordered" to make the transfer, not her, and that Craig had to do exactly what the
Court ordered without her help.31
55.

Craig personally provided all documents to Dean Witter and Prudential that he was

told were required to have the funds transferred. Craig was informed that the funds had to be
transferred to an account that Bonnie had created. Bonnie said that she told Dean Witter but proof
of that was never made and all information from Dean Witter did not reflect any instructions from
Bonnie.32
Boat Transfer:
56.

Bonnie and Craig purchased the Sea Ray Motor Boat from Garth Thurgood more

than eight (8) years ago in exchange for $17,500.00. Thurgood never asked for any more and
never made any claim against the boat.33
57.

Craig obtained and completed the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles papers that

only needed a police officer to drive out and check the boat and serial number. Bonnie refused to
help in any way. She declined to permit a police officer to look at the boat.34
58.

Bonnie had the boat in her possession but said would not do anything to that she

demanded a bill of sale not just from Craig but also from Thurgood. Bonnie is a personal friend of
Thurgood's wife.35
59.

Craig contacted Thurgood.

Indicating to Craig that he knew that Bonnie had

required that Craig obtain a bill of sale from him, Thurgood said that he would only sign a bill of

30

Supplementary Decree of Divorce, November 22, 1999, page 5, paragraph 18.
Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 12, paragraph 52
32
Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 53
33
Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 54
34
Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 56
35
Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 57

31
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sale in exchange for an additional $1,500.00. A copy of the Thurgood Affidavit is attached hereto
as "Exhibit R."36
Signetics Retirement — Bonnie's
60.

The Court's Order was that the Bonnie provide Craig with information required to

prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, transferring one half interest in the Signetics account
to Craig.37
61.

As of the date of the divorce the Signetics account had a net value of $28,754.00.38

Return of Attorney Fees Claimed to pursue Order to Show Cause against Craig
62.

Given her total lack of cooperation to effectuate transfer as ordered by the Court

Craig received additional information from Bonnie that the attorney fees submitted by Mr. Schultz
and awarded were excessive and should be reduced and refunded as to the Contempt allegation.
Bonnie told Craig that Mr. Moody's legal fees for that matter was $1,900.00 but that Schultz had
made a claim of $8,000.00, just padding the numbers.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
Bonnie's stratagem under the guise of Court Order sets forth evidence that she intentionally acted
in disregard of and excess of the Court's Orders.
The Court awarded Bonnie a list of specified property of substantial value. In addition to
the property specifically mentioned, the Court awarded Bonnie,39
All remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman/Loeboecke Associates. [Emphasis added]
Brad Townsend, CPA, of the firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates, prepared that
schedule A under direction of the Court's Order dated February 20, 1998.40. That Order directed
36

Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 58
Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 13, paragraph 59
38
Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 13, paragraph 60

37
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Bonnie to "provide Norman/Loebbecke Associates" with her identification of any property she may
claim and facts underlying any such claim.
Bonnie had almost two years to make any claim against the personal property located in the
storage building. The storage building was within her control and under her custody. Bonnie also
had some of her own stuff stored in that building. She was well acquainted with everything there.
She had the key. She was a member of the family that used that building. She had been a member
of that family for many years. It would be ludicrous for Bonnie to make any claim of surprise. It
would be ludicrous for Bonnie to make any claim that she didn't know who ov/ned and used any
item personal property.
Bonnie made no claim to any of that personal property before trial. She made no claim
during trial. She made no timely claim after trial or until March 1, 2000.
Even at the hearing on March 1, 2000 Bonnie stipulated that she was making no claim to
any of the personal property in the storage building with the exception that she needed some tools
to maintain her house and yard. Craig was to retain all his personal property then in his possession
and all his personal property located at that time in the storage building.
Bonnie's counsel, Mr. Moody, read the stipulation into the Court record at the March 1,
2000 hearing. Mr. Moody said "Mrs. Harris will take what personal tools that she would like to
have out of the shop [the storage building] by the 15th of March."41
But then Bonnie took everything. Then to the Pleasant Grove Police Department, Bonnie
claimed that the building had been burglarized. Bonnie's malevolence is clearly demonstrated by
the fact that she or someone else under her control removed a lag screw from the track of one
garage door, trying to make it appear that an unlawful forced entry had been made. Bonnie was
39
40

"Exhibit E," page 4, paragraph 9.
"Exhibit B," Order appointing the firm of Norman/Loebbecke, dated 2/20/98
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the only one who had the key. She had just previously changed all the locks. Bonnie's claim of
forced entry was a lie.
Note that the Pleasant Grove Police Department's Report states that, "it did not look like
there was anything missing."42 Information supporting such a statement in the police report could
only have come from Bonnie. It was she who reported the "crime." It must have been she who
met the police. It was she who pointed the finger at Craig's son, Scott.
Bottom Line—Bonnie knew exactly what she was doing.

She knew she had never

previously made any claim against Craig's or anybody else's property in the storage building.
Bonnie had previously decided that she had no claim against Craig's personal property in the
storage building. Bonnie had previously decided to not make any claim against Craig's personal
property in the storage building. Bonnie knew that the Court ordered that any claim she wished to
make against any marital property or property of Craig must be reported before the discovery cutoff date prior to trial. Bonnie never made any claim then. Bonnie may not make any such claim
now.
For some reason she just got angry after the hearing and wanted more. In violation of the
Order of the Court, she took property that was awarded to Craig and a number of other persons.
Bonnie has flatly refused to return any of that property. Bonnie stands in defiance of the
Order of this Court. She is in contempt of court and appropriate sanctions must be imposed.
POINT 2
Bonnie obtained transfer of funds in excess of the amount Ordered.
Craig and Bonnie personally discussed the fact that the Court had ordered that she was to
receive Craig's Prudential IRA account, then valued by the Court at $2,666.00. By the time that
IRA account was transferred to Bonnie it contained $4,885.00. That's more than an 83% increase
41

Transcript of Hearing, "Exhibit I," page 5, lines 6-8.
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in one year. Bonnie's claim that Craig wrongfully manipulated that account to her detriment has
absolutely no merit.
Apparently, not being satisfied with an 83%+ increase, Bonnie took both IRA accounts,
netting her an additional $16,292.39 more than what the Court ordered.
In addition to that Bonnie also levied an additional interest on all totals, demanding
additional interest from the date of Divorce until the date paid of $3,787.61 that she claimed was
interest due from January 26, 1999 to May 31, 2000.
POINT 3
Bonnie took more than $4.958.00, from Craig's life insurance over and above the Order of the
Court.
Bonnie claimed to the Court that she was entitled to all funds in the live insurance policy
even money deposited to the account after the Decree of Divorce. The value at the date of divorce
was $16,042.00. Craig had continued to pay his own life insurance policy after the decree of
divorce, otherwise he is presently uninsurable. Knowing that the insurance policy had increased to
a cash value had increased because of Craig's continued payments, Bonnie refused to accept the
Court ordered value and demanded ownership of the policy, thereby obtaining to herself an
additional $4,958.00 over what the Court had granted.

Bonnie told Craig that she then

immediately cashed the policy and took all the cash.
When Bonnie obtained ownership of the life insurance on the life of Craig she did so in
violation of Utah law and through misrepresentation to the Court.
CONCLUSION
The facts establish that Bonnie stands in open defiance with little regard for the Orders of
the Court. Remaining unpleased with the Orders of the Court, Bonnie has resorted to self-help.

Pleasant Grove Police Department Report, "Exhibit L."
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Bonnie's conduct requires that she be held in contempt of court and that appropriate sanctions be
imposed to deter such further conduct. Bonnie and those who assisted must be held accountable.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court issue its order granting judgment in his
favor against Bonnie as follows:
A.

$23,000.00 for items "missing" from the storage building;

B.

$4,600.00 for Craig's personal property taken from the storage building;

C.

$2,925.00 for AID Equipment property taken from the storage building;

D.

$3,734.00 for Dick Harris' property taken from the storage building;

E.

$8,600.00 for Troy and Scott Harris' property taken from the storage building;

F.

$16,292.39 for overage taken from Craig's Prudential IRA account;

G.

$4,958.00 for overage taken from Craig's MONY life account;

H.

$3,787.61 excess interest assessed from January 26, 1999;

I.

Since the total amount set forth above constitutes a value of $67,897.00 actual loss,
Craig prays that a penalty of an additional amount of $67,897.00, double the
amount unlawfully taken, be awarded to Craig for a total of $135,794.00 plus
interest and that such judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable
costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or
otherwise as shall be established by affidavit; plus

J.

Return of such attorney fees and costs previously awarded to Bonnie and award of
attorney fees and costs to Craig as the Court may determine; and

K.

Such additional and further relief as the Court may deem just.

DATED December \CI

, 2000.
MARTIN & NELSON, PC
CounseJ for Petitioner

\-S
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Ldpen D. Martin /
Attorney at Law
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LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C.
Loren D. Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

STIPULATION AS TO
ACCOUNTING AND
DETERMINATION OF VALUES

vs.
BONNIE HARRIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 954402034 DA
Judge: Anthony W. Schofield

The parties hereby Stipulate that all questions and disputes related to
accounting and determination of all property, both real and personal, values shall be
submitted to the firm of Norman-Loebbecke Associates.
Each of the parties shall provide Norman-Loebbecke Associates with the facts
which each believes is material to the identification of property, the underlying facts
claimed as to such property. Both parties shall fully cooperate in providing
Norman-Loebbecke Associates with access to any and all information which said
firm shall request.

1

Should there be any dispute as to any such matters the question may be
brought before the Court by way of motion for an appropriate order.
Plaintiff shall engage and pay the costs of the services of Norman-Loebbecke
Associates. The cost of such services may be paid under the business account and
shall be considered by the Court and assessed or allocated in whole or in part equally
between both parties as the Court may determine appropriate in the final order or
decree, considering how such costs relate to all other issues at that time.

wh*m^_
Dated:

9g

Bonnie Harris

.» .

n

r^>

Dated:__J^Ql3Sl

/Lorfen D. Martin
/
Counsel for Plaintiff

Margo Hiller-Polster
Counsel for Defendant
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LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C.
Loren D. Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Plaintiff,

ORDER Re: THE
ACCOUNTING AND
DETERMINATION OF VALUES

vs.
BONNIE HARRIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 954402034 DA
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr.

Based upon the stipulation of the parties and for good cause shown it is
hereby ORDERED DECREED AND ADJUDGED:
All questions and disputes related to accounting and determination of all
property, both real and personal, values shall be submitted to the firm of NormanLoebbecke Associates.
Each of the parties shall provide Norman-Loebbecke Associates with the facts
which each believes is material to the identification of property, the underlying facts
claimed as to such property. Both parties shall fully cooperate in providing

Norman-Loebbecke Associates with access to any and all information which said
firm shall request.
Should there be any dispute as to any such matters the question may be
brought before the Court by way of motion for an appropriate order.
Plaintiff shall engage and pay the costs of the services of Norman-Loebbecke
Associates. The cost of such services may be paid under the business account and
shall be considered by the Court and assessed or allocated in whole or in part equally
between both parties as the Court may determine appropriate in the final order or
decree, considering how such costs relate to all other issues at that time.
DATED this

, 1998.

day of.

BY THE COURT:

URT JUDGE
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Harris v. Harris
?:c'j<:$ca Marital Asset and Liability Distribution
pe: Craig Harris

Proposed
Distribution
Description
Cash &. Cash Equivalents
BafikOne.i250^
Northwest Credit Union7592.0:Sayihgs:::;;;:::;;;:;
NoiSwest Credit^
Zion's Bank 560-30939-5 'Personal.Checking1;;
Zioh's Bank:550-31378-5.Spe^alChec|wg:;;.;;;

Net
Value

Bonnie

•:"'$'::"1:C90':
:

j

: ::

:li! i.ii27s ;;; "
1!ll[!-HUil::235:;iii:::r
lii:554-:':

11^^-3;--:

554;;;;:
-•3'
-:: 554;::- K .2.607:

;::;;;;::-3,l61: ••

Stocks and Bonds
]Ser^st ; Medica[sto

Craig

I|ifl4|4'b9:::^--;

iiii4;«9:!

WmAA^M '^M--WM,^M4,409::

Retirement A ccounts
•D^hWt^
fteanWit^
:Pwdenfia!rSecur^
Signetics Retirement*

!i3B;§23] :
i:«£l8;l
;|;;-2,666;
28J54
117,262

|:H;ll|iil:iip5;923; :

§OT42i;

I;iilll|-:i6';04'2'!;

p:16i042;;

ilillllj!!!!!;:! 15.042:

:F^::^:i!:iii::::^:--::.2,655r
28.754
77,672

39,559

Life Insurance

poNlwhoteS
Land/Residence
House and Lot located at 692 S. Juniper St., Pleasant Grove, UT3
iCommerc^^
Building and Lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT
Vernal, UT -10 Acres, Uintah County Property
Businesses
•IW&iEqyipm^
Vehicles
•iS94.FbrdTaum$;GUi!;ij^
IISS^S'Kom^
1978 25' Sea Ray Motor Boat

103,591
103,591
i^?5,196 ;
!i425;;i96;i:i:
^..46,443;;;:::hl;i;*:?^*„3!ii!
41,116
41,116
28,053
28,053
4,160
4,160
648,559
50,603
597,956
:!147:533!
; 147,533-

;|i;!::iiiii;!;:347;533:|
:147,533

"
;;;:;;;6,613:
2,500
12,213

6,613:::::;:::!;::
"3.1 obi;:-"::
9.713

2.500
2,500

Furnhure/Furnishings/AppUances

ii^668!y!i!;id;nl!iHI=i:!ii:s;6be^
y^WejbY;:^;:;^
Furniture and Personal Property - Bonnie
Other Assets
Gun reloading equipment

8,395
15,595
.

4,198
9.-.5S
: 500

500
' 500

Debts and Liabilities

4,198
6,398

-•-::-..
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J. Grant Moody, P.C. Bar No. 6282
336 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-4181
Facsimile: (801)756-3940
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
vs.

])
>
]
]

SUPPLEMENTARY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

:

BONNIE HARRIS

Respondent.

)

Civil No. 954402034DA

])

Judge: Ray Harding, Jr.

This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16,17 and September 23,1999
with a final hearing being held on October 12,1999, Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also
present and was represented by J, Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing
arguments on September 23,1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney* s fees until the October 12, 1999
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and fhrther
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22,
1999, The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January

26, 1999, The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and througji
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division
presented to the Cowrt The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
and the Court having reviewed the evidence and the record, and being fiilly advised in the
premises, now enters the following:
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE
Property Division
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were S141,800.00
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00.
2. The property shall be valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being
January 26,1999.
3. The following deductions shall be subtracted from the Respondents premarital assets:
a. $14,602,00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate;
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26,
1999.
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are reduced to a total of $78,804.00.
5. The total net divisible value of the estate at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered
was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 19 Schedule A. A copy of said Schedule A
is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein.
6. Included in this total value is. Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a
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value of $28,754.00- The Signetics retirement account is to be divided according to the formula
stated in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties shall enter a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire,
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value
of $946,519,00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus
$725,915,00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his
premarital assets of $141,800,00 for a total of 5504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to
Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50.
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court awards Petitioner the
business, AID Equipment Company, Lie, and the Commercial building, house and lot located at
172 West 9400 South in Sandy. Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is
$147,533.00, and the value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore,
Petitioner is awarded property with a total value of $572,729.00.
9. The Respondent is awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule
A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. Therefore,
Respondent is awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. Because the total value
distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent is entitled to a credit of $67,971.50.

ALIMONY
3

10. The Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner.

ATTQRflOT'SFEES
11 • Each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter, with the exception of
the Court's Order dated January 26,1999, wherein the Court awarded Petitioner a reasonable
attorney's fee for bringing the October 19, 1998, Order to Show Cause.
12. The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees totaling $5,711.48,
however, pursuant to the Court's Findings, only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's
affidavit were related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court thus awards the Petitioner
$2,564.16 in attorney's foes for the October 19,1999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its
January 26,1999 Order.

NQRMAN LQEBBfiCKJS FEE?
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17.
14. Respondent is ordered to bear $1,744,00 of this total as her sole and separate
obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22,1999 in which the Court allowed
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates*
15. The Court orders that both parties shall equally bear the remaining fees of
$20,699J 7, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is required to
pay $12,093-59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay $10,349.58.
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the
Court orders that the Petitioner be responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for
4

the property division.
17. The Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award of $2,564.16
to Petitioner for attorney's fees and offset by $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman Loebbeckc
fees- The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75.
18. Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and personal property
division as ordered by the Court.
19. The Court orders that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner be stayed sixty
(60) days after the entry of this Order to allow the Petitioner time to secureftmdsto pay the
judgment.

^

DATED tMs / ^yjday of November, 1999.
)URT:

Hstrict Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

LorenD. Martin
Attorney for Petitioner
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Schedule A

Harris v. Harris
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution
per Craig Harris

Proposed
Distr bution
Description

Net
Value

Cash &. Cash Equivalents
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking
Northwest Credit Union 7592.0 Savings
Northwest Credit Union 7592.1 Checking
Zion's Bank 560-30939-5 Personal Checking
Zion's Bank 560-31378-5 Special Checking

1,050
1,279
235
554
3
3,161

Bonnie

Craig

S

$

1 090
1.279
235

554
3
2.607

554

Stocks and Bonds
InterWest Medical stock
Retirement A ccounts
!;Peah;Wit!egi24-100296 IRA Standard
p ^ a n W p t i 7 9 039509 IRA Standard
iPrucfentialSecurities OUQ-R68840-41 Simple IRA
Signetics Retirement*
Life Insurance
MONY Whole Life 1347-24-19W
New York Life 42594539 Term Life
Land/Residence
House and Lot located at 692 S. Juniper St., Pleasant Grove, UT 9
:Sommerci^

;:Hdi^;artdf
Building and Lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT
Vernal, UT - 1 0 Acres, Uintah County Property
Businesses
•|^PiEquipimeW;Cqm
Vehicles
;:l994.FordTaums^^
:V§83:25; K i m ^
1978 25'Sea Ray Motor Boat
Furniture/Furnishings/Appu'ances
V
^^^'^3^^3^OT\Z\
Property-Craig
;lJeWeljy:;;;;;;:;:;-;;;:;^';;
Furniture and Personal Property - Eonnie
Other Assets
Gun reloading eouipment
Debts and Liabilities

14,409
14,409

14,409
14,409,

-

36,923

"

48,918
2,666

:!;:^aiS::hi:!::l;=:;;=iPl!!i|
•iii:^i!:!::ii;iiii^:P::-i!:2,65S;'

28,754
117,262

28,754
77,672

35,923:;

39,559

16,042

16,042

16,042

15.042

103,591
103,591
425;:196:ii::
1^25,196
a:46,443-:;i: W*$MM
41,116
41,116
28,053
28,053
4,160
4,160
548,559
50,603
597,956

MWlK

WAfMy-

:-147,533l

i:147.;533T

i;:;::6,613
2,500
12,213
5,000
2,200
8.395
15,595
.

500''
500

6,613

*3M
9,713

2.500
2.500
5.000'

2,200
4,198
6,398

-

4,196
9,198

••

• 500
500

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Petitioner has five
(5) daysfromthe date of service to file an objection to the foregoing Supplementary
Decree of Divorce which on this

6

day of November, 1999, a true

and correct copy was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Loren D. Martin
P.O. Box 11590
SaltLakeCity,UT84111
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J. Grant Moody, P.C. Bar No. 6282
336 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-4181
Facsimile: (801)756-3940
Attorney for Respondent
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,

AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

BONNIE HARRIS
Civil No. 954402034DA
Respondent.

Judge: Ray Harding, Jr.

This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16, 17 and September 23,1999
with a final hearing being held on October 12, 1999. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also
present and was represented by J. Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing
arguments on September 23,1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney's fees until the October 12,1999
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and further
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22,
1999. The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January

26, 1999. The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and through
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division
presented to the Court. In ruling on the remaining issues, the Court carefully considered and
weighed the evidence relating to: (1) the amount and kind of property to be divided: (2) whether
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; (3) the source of the property; (4) the
health of the parties; (5) the parties' standard of living; (6) the parties' respective financial
conditions, needs and earning capacity; (7) the duration of the marriage; (8) the children of the
marriage; (9) the parties' ages at the time of the marriage and of the divorce; (10) what the parties
gave up because of the marriage; and (11) the necessary relationship the property division has
with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Therefore, having carefully
reviewed the evidence and the record in light of the above factors, and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court now makes the following Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law in this matter:
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT
Property Division
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were $141,800.00
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00.
2. The Court finds that it is fair and equitable andfindsthat the property should be
valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being January 26,1999.
3. In a document entitled "Calculation of Division of Value per Bonnie Harris"
2

submitted at the October 12, 1999 hearing, Respondent acknowledged certain reductions in her
premarital assets:
a. $14,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; and
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26,
1999.
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are thus reduced to a total of $78,804.00.
5. The Court finds that the total net divisible value of the estate at the time of the Decree
of Divorce was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Schedule A, prepared by Norman
Loebbecke Associates. A copy of said Schedule A is attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein.
6. Included in this total value is Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a
value of $28,754.00. The Signetics retirement account should be divided according to the
formula stated in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties should enter
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire.
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's
premarital assets of $78,804.00fromthe net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his
premarital assets of $141,800.00 for a total of $504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to
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Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50.
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Courtfindsthat the parties
marital property is most equitably divided by awarding Petitioner the business, AID Equipment
Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 172 West 9400 South in
Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is $147,533.00, and the
value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, Petitioner is awarded
property with a total value of $572,729.00.
9. The Respondent should be awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in
Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the
exception of the Signetics retirement which is to be divided pursuant to Woodward as set forth
above. Therefore, Respondent should be awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00.
Because the total value distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent should be
entitled to a credit of $67,971.50.
ALIMONY
10. In considering whether the Respondent is entitled to alimony, the Court considered
the financial condition and needs of the Respondent; the Respondent's earning capacity or ability
to produce income; the ability of the Petitioner to provide support; and the length of the marriage.
Having considered these factors in light of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the
Respondent is not entitled to receive alimonyfromthe Petitioner having duly considered the
following factors as set forth below, weighing each factor as indicated:
4

(a) The Financial Condition and Needs of the Recipient Spouse: The Court finds
that the parties' respective standards of living at the time of marriage were both significantly
enhanced during the marriage. Due consideration has been given to attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standard of living. Viewing the facts most favorable to the Respondent; her
premarital separate net assets were $78,804.00. Considering all factors, setoffs, and adjustments
takenfromthe report of the CPAfirmof Norman/Loebbecke Associates, Respondent is awarded
assets with a net value of $441,761.50 in this matter. The substantial assets Respondent has
received will contribute to and assist the Respondent with her ability to support herself.
(b) The Recipient's Earning Capacity or Ability to Produce Income. The parties
were separated in August 1995 and the divorce was filed in September 1995. Before and during
the marriage and through 1992, the Respondent was employed at Signetics, a semi-conductor
company in Quality Assurance/Quality Control. After her employment ended with Signetics, the
Respondent attended college classes in business. The Respondent did not seek employment after
her employment ended and stayed home to take care of a grandchild during which time she was
receiving temporary support from the Petitioner. The Respondent testified that for the past
several years, she had no physical or mental disability which prevented herfrombeing gainfully
employed.
(c) The Ability of the Payor Spouse to Provide Support. The Petitioner's earning
power is reflected in the valuation of the business. The value of that business is divided between
the parties as reflected in the accounting report of Norman/Loebbecke Associates.
5

(d) The Length of the Marriage. The parties were married for over 16 years from
the time of the marriage in 1992 until the parties divorce was final in January 1999.
(e) Whether the Recipient Spouse Has Custody of Minor Children Requiring
Support. No Children have been born in the marriage and none are expected.
(f) Whether the Recipient Spouse Worked in the Business Owned or Operated
by the Payor Spouse. During the marriage, the Respondent only worked for a short period of
time at AID Equipment, Inc.
(g) Whether the Recipient Spouse Directly Contributed to Anv Increase in the
Pavor Spouse *s Skill by Paving for Education Received bv the Pavor Spouse or Allowing the
Payor Spouse to Attend School During the Marriage. The Respondent did not directly contribute
to any increase in the Petitioner's skills pay or pay for his education.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
11. The Court finds that each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter,
with the exception of the Court's Order dated January 26,1999, wherein the Court awarded
Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee for bringing the October 19,1998, Order to Show Cause.
12. The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees totaling $5,711.48.
Upon review of counsel's affidavit the court finds that many of the entries were not related to the
Order to Show Cause but were for work done prior to drafting and preparing for the Order to
Show Cause. The Court finds that only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's affidavit were
related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court awards Petitioner $2,564.16 in attorney's fees
6

for the October 19, 1999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its January 26, 1999 Order.
NORMAN LOEBBECKE FEES
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17.
14. The Court finds that Respondent should bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and
separate obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22, 1999 in which the Court allowed
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates.
15. The Court finds that both parties should equally bear the remaining fees of
$20,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is therefore
required to pay $12,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay
$10,349.58.
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the
Court finds that the Petitioner is responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for
the property division.
17. As set forth above, Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award
of $2,564.16 to Petitioner for attorney's fees and $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman
Loebbecke fees. The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75.
18. Each party should be ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and
delivering the necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and
personal property division as ordered by the Court.
7

19. The Court finds that it is proper that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner
should be stayed sixty (60) days after the entry of the Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure
funds to pay the judgment.
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Each party is awarded the property both personal and real as set forth in the above
Findings of Fact
2. No alimony is awarded in this case.
3. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, each party shall pay their own
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter.
4. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, the parties shall share equally in the
costs for Norman/Loebbecke.
5. The Respondent is awarded JUDGMENT against the Petitioner in the amount of
$53,313.75.
6. Execution on the judgement is stayed for sixty days following the entry of an Order on
this Ruling to allow Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the judgment
7. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce shall be entered accordingly.
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DATED this

/

day of

, 2000.
OURT:

ii M. HARDING
District Court
Approved as to Form:

Loren D. Martin
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on t h e / £ ^ day of March, 2000, I faxed and mailed a copy by US
Postal Service, postage prepaid, the foregoing Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to:
Loren D. Martin
Attorney for Petitioner
P.O. Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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MARTIN & NELSON
A Professional Corporation
Loren D.Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY MARTIN

v.
BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

Case No: 95-44-02034 DA
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr.

)
ss.
)

I, Larry Martin, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

That the information contained herein is of my own personal knowledge, I

am competent to so testify and would so testify if called as a witness before the Court.
2.

I am Vice President of Martin Door Mfg. My duties include supervision of

engineering, equipment, manufacturing and testing of all products.

I have been

associated with Martin Door Mfg. for more than 50 years, installing, designing,
fabricating and engineering garage doors.

PSCTP N n
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3.

I have been primarily responsible for the writing of safety standards and

specifications for the garage door industry in the United States under the request of the
US Consumer Product Safety Division.

I have previously testified before and/or

provided evidence to several courts in Utah, California and the Consumer Product
Safety Division in Washington, D.C.
4.

I personally supervised and performed scientific testing of Martin Door

Mfg.'s products under the most rigid of safety and zoning compliance requirements.
Such testing included measurement of the force required to breach the security of
Martin Overhead Door products as required by the State of Florida building code to
withstand and exceed the demand to meet and withstand hurricane storms and
associated debris.
5.

On March 20, 2000 I personally examined the site of a Storage building

located at 725 Orchard in Pleasant Grove. The building had three Martin Door Mfg.
Garage doors that had been installed on the South side in addition to a walk-through
secured door on the West. The photographs attached hereto give a true and correct
representation of the building and specific items of interest.
6.

I was informed that the garage door that was alleged to have been

breached was the door farthest to the East. Closely examining the door, I observed that
the bottom lag screw used to secure the wheel track had been removed on one side.
The removal of that lag screw would permit the twisting of the track in such a manner as
to remove one bottom wheel from the track, allowing that bottom end of the door to be
pushed open approximately one foot at the most.

Pa^e N o ? of d

7.

The resultant opening would be too small to admit an adult person

without bending and causing damage to the bottom panel or without also removing the
next upper track "L" bracket to give more entry space.
8.

The "L" brackets are used to secure the wheel track to the doorjamb of the

building. None of the "L" brackets had been bent, twisted or damaged. As can be seen
from the photographs, the Door itself had not sustained any damage that in any manner
appeared incident to or in any manner sufficient to cause any breach.
9.

Photographs were taken of both the inside and outside of the door. Of

particular interest was the examination of the hole that remained in the doorjamb from
which the bottom lag screw had been removed.
10.

It is my opinion, based upon experience in testing forces and observing

the results of the force required to remove such lag screws, that the lag screw in
question had not been forcibly removed from the outside. Someone had intentionally
unscrewed the lag screw from the inside. The remaining hole in the doorjamb was
consistent with having been physically unscrewed by some individual.

Close up

photographs were taken of the "L" bracket and remaining hole. Had that lag screw been
removed by force from the outside, the remaining hole would have caused considerable
damage to the wood. The "L" bracket would have been deformed and twisted, the track
would have been twisted to some degree and the exterior of the door itself would have
been warped and damaged.
11.

On the exterior of the door were some small marks that appeared to be

abrasions. Close-up photographs were taken of the abrasions on the outside of the
door in the vicinity of the purported breach and entry. Such marks are not consistent
with a forced entry.

12.

My conclusion is that someone manually removed the interior lag screw

with a wrench for the apparent purpose of making it appear that the door had been
breached. Someone did what I observed with access to the inside of the building by
keyed entry. I observed no evidence of forced entry. The observed "breach" of the
door could have only been done from inside the Storage building.
Dated December _T3_, 2000.

Larry MaifKiTAffiant
Subscribed and Sworn to before me on December / £ _ , 2000.
_ ,.„-._x
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L0REN D. MARTIN , Notary Public
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J. GRANT MOODY, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
Attorney and Counselor at Law

336 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
(801)756-4181
Fax:(801)756-3940

March 27, 2000

Loren D. Martin
MARTIN & NELSON
P.O. Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590
Re: Harris vs. Harris
Dear Mr. Martin:
The weekend of March 4, 2000, Bonnie had several people helping her remove the
property from the storage building including the boat and the 5th wheel. Bonnie removed the boat
and the 5th Wheel including ski's, knee board, ski rope and life vests that went with the boat and
she took the stuff that went with the 5th >vheel. Bonnie purchased the skis at Granny's Auction in
Provo in for $25.00 over 10 years ago. Bonnie is entitled to keep the items that went with the
boat and trailer.
2. Bonnie took items that she had been storing in the building.
3. Bonnie took some shelving and various open end wrenches and sockets and some
miscellaneous tools that were left in the building. Virtually anything of value had been removed
by Craig or Scot or some other person between last November, 1999 and March 4, 2000. At the
hearing on March 1, 2000, Bonnie thought that there would be some newer power tools that she
could use that were in the shop in November, however, when she went into the building after the
hearing the "good stuff' had been removed. Some of the power tools left in the shop were in
disrepair and/or not working. After Bonnie changed the locks on the building, in November,
1999, Scott admitted to her that he had gotten back into the building to get his stuff out of the
building.
4. Bonnie filed a police report on the weekend of March 4, 2000 when she discovered
that someone had been breaking into the building by way of the East bay door infrontof the 5th
wheel. Apparently someone forced the door open by running a blue SUV type vehicle into the
door which left blue marks on the door. Bonnie noticed the last three times she went into the
shed last November that the kitchen light was on in the 5th wheel and each time she turned the
light off. The 5th wheel was in front of the East bay door which was used to gain access. It is my
understanding that neither Scot nor Craig have admitted that they were getting into the building

Mr. Loren D. Martin
March 24. 2000
Page Two

and have not done so (other than Scot in November) since Bonnie changed the locks in
November and after the pad-lock was placed on the door in early December. Bonnie had not
been in the shed since December. 1999, when she put the padlock on the building until after the
hearing on March L 2000. At the hearing, she assumed that the hand and power tools she had
seen the last time she was in the building, would still be there. Instead, she discovered that most
of tools with any value had been removed or stolen.
Enclosed is a partial list of the items that were not removed by Bonnie but were taken
from the shop Bonnie took a video on November 8, 1999 which indicated what was in the
building at that time. Bonnie had some still pictures that were taken of some additional
equipment and various items before the trial. Brad Townsend saw the pictures of the equipment.
5. Bonnie did not take the Aqua Skooter nor does she have it. Bonnie has not seen
Scot's fishing equipment and she does not have Scot's sports cards. Bonnie gave Scot his cards
over four years ago. If there are items missing, that neither Craig, Scot or Bonnie took out of the
shed, a list of the missing items needs to be given to the police.
6. Bonnie will return the winch to whomever it belongs to provided they can prove
ownership.
7. In order to settle this matter, Bonnie agrees to return all of the gun re-loading
equipment on the condition that:
A. Craig will pay her the $500.00 listed on the schedule for the gun reloading equipment
in addition to the $5,000 for the personal property. The gun reloading equipment was listed
separately in the property schedule and was not part of the $5,000.00 personal property amount.
B. Craig immediately signs the three quit claim deeds to the Pleasant Grove Property to
Bonnie.
C. Craig obtain assignments of the Interwest Medical stock interests from Louise Harris.
Scot Harris and Troy Harris and he then transfer his interest in the stock to Bonnie.
D. Craig will pay Bonnie the amount owing on the judgment of $53,313.75 minus the
line of credit amount of $28,016.00.
E. That Craig pay Bonnie the amount of $2,604 representing the value of Craig's "Cash
and Cash Equivalents" listed in Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree.
F. That Craig pay Bonnie the amount of $16,042.00 representing the cash value of the
MONY life insurance cash value at the time of the Decree of Divorce.

Mr. Loren D. Martin
March 24. 2000
Page Three

G. That Craig sign the necessary transfer papers to transfer the cash value of his IRA's to
Bonnie valued at the time of the Divorce on the Dean Witter Acct. # 124-100296 of $67,133, and
the Prudential Securities Simple IRA Acct. # OUQ-R68840-41 of $4,847.{ The Judge awarded
Bonnie the IRA and not the *%nef after tax value. Bonnie is allowed to transfer the face value of
the two IRA's, valued at the time of the Decree of Divorce to her without any tax consequences.
Pursuant to the Judge's Order in the Decree, Bonnie was awarded Craig's IRAs.
H. The value of the shelving that Bonnie took from the shed, purportedly owned by AID
Equipment has minimal fair market value. On the company's capital asset account provided to
Brad Townsend, the shelving in the P.G. building would have had little or no value on the
Company's books. It is Bonnie's position that the gun reloading equipment and supplies were
given to her by the Court as a separate asset from the $5,000 personal property listed by Craig.
The gun reloading equipment was listed separately in the schedules and were awarded to Bonnie.
She has previously agreed to give Dick Harris and Scott Harris any of the reloading equipment
that was theirs. Simply stating that everything is theirs and not Craig's does not make it so.
Bonnie will return any items belonging to third parties provided the\ can specifically identify
each item and document ownership.
I. Bonnie is agreeable to returning all the gun reloading equipment and supplies. Bonnie
believes that it is fair that she keep the shelving she has in her possession to use in the building as
an offset for the substantial difference in value for the gun reloading equipment as opposed to the
1

The Decree awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A to
Bonnie with the exception of the Commercial Property and AID Equipment and the Signetics
Retirement which was to be divided by a QDRO. The IRA's are different than the cash value of
the insurance policy in that Bonnie was only entitled to the asset of the insurance policy which
was its cash surrender value.
Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code §408(d)(6). "The transfer of an individual's interest in
an individual retirement account or an individual retirement annuity to his spouse or former
spouse under a divorce or separation instrument described in subparagraph (A) of section
71(b)(2) is not to be considered a taxable transfer made by such individual notwithstanding any
other provision of this subtitle, and such interest at the time of the transfer is to be treated as an
individual retirement account of such spouse, and not of such individual. Thereafter such
account or annuity for purposes of this subtitle is to be treated as maintained for the benefit of
such spouse."
IRC § 71(b)(2)(A) states: "(2) Divorce or separation instrument: The term divorce or
separation instrument* means: (A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written
instrument incident to such a decree."

Mr. Loren D. Martin
March 24. 2000
Page Four

value that was listed in the schedules and for the substantial value of the personal property that
was taken by Craig and Scot in November and December, 1999.
G. There is a large tarp that covers the 26 ft. boat that was taken from the shed. Bonnie
would like the tarp returned. She would also like the parts to the boat return. There was a yellow
bucket and a blue tote box with parts that went to the boat motor that were removed from the
shed prior to March 4, 2000. Bonnie is requesting that your client fix the doors to the shed that
have been broken by your clients forcefully entering the shed.
H. If there are specific items that your client believes are missing that are not on the list
of "missing items' we have provided, please let us know so we can inform the police.
If the Quit Claim Deeds are not signed and the money that is due Bonnie is not paid by
5:00 p.m. on Friday March 31, 2000, we will proceed with an Order to Show Cause.
Also, be aware that Charles A. Schultz will be filing an appearance as co-counsel and will
be assisting in the execution of the judgement.
Very truly yours,

J. Grant Moody
Attorney at Law
cc: Client
Enclosures

Harris v. Harris
Listed below are the items Bonnie noticed are missing from the shed. There may be other
items that are missins:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

New 5" Delta Grinder (still in box)
Welding torches, gauges and hoses
Two disk grinders
Four drills
Sawzall
Three skill saws
Miter box saw
Belt sander
Worm drive skill saw
Three booster cables
Air socket set, impact wrenches, two air guns (big and small)
Target thrower
Honda generator EM35005
Jet ski
Aqua scooter
Cover for the Sea Ray Boat (covers the entire boat)
Reddy heater
Propane heater
Gas chain saw
Disk sander
Battery charger
Chain Hoist
Trolling motor
Two re-loaders
Reloading equipment, some supplies
Gun cleaning tools, equipment and cases
Parts belonging to the Sea Ray boat motors and out drives

TabH

•;«*$SV#
?: 1*3

MARTLN & NELSON
A Professional Corporation
Loren D. Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah S4147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

v.
BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.
Petitioner,

Case No:
95-44-02034 DA
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr.

CRAIG JACK

HARRIS,

respectfully

files

this

MOTION

FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS pursuant to this Court's ruling at
trial. During the trial the Court stated that it would revisit the issue of valuation as well as entertain
motions for reconsideration once an order was in place.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Petitioner filed his Complaint for divorce on September 20. 1995.1

2.

On October 19, 1998, the Court bifurcated this matter, granting the parties a divorce

on January 26. 1999. but making the divorce effective October 19. 1998.2
?.
1

The issue of disposition of property was reserved for further hearine.

Complaint, dak-d September 20. 19^5
Decree of l)w<>t\(. dated January 26. 1999.
Id. at paragraph 2

4.

A trial on the issue of disposition of property was held on August 16, August 17,

September 23. and October 12, 1999.
5.

During the trial on October 12. 1999. the Court ruled that it was going to get an

order in place and once that order was in place the Court would be happy to revisit the issue of
valuation and would be happy to hear any motions for reconsideration.4
6.

On October 12, 1999, the Court stated the following:

THE COURT: So both of you understand. I'd be happy to hear your motions for
reconsideration. Today's not the appropriate time. We're going to get an order in
place and then we're happy to go ahead and revisit.5
Then again just prior to the conclusion of the trial, the Court stated the following:
THE COURT: Once I've entered that, Til then direct one of you to prepare
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in conformance. And then if you've
got motions to reconsider, then your timing would be appropriate.6
7.

An order is now in place.7

8.

On November 22. 1999, the Court signed a Supplementary Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and a Supplementary Decree of Divorce which documents were entered on
November 29, 1999.8
9.

Since the trial the Respondent has so interpreted the Decree, maneuvered the

transfer of property, and failed to comply with requirements of the Court imposed upon herself so
as to unlawfully transfer to herself a much greater cash dollar value than directed b\ the Court at
trial.9

Transcript of Hearing. Volume IV. page 22. lines 10-1? and page ?9. lines 15-17. included hcreir. as "Exhibit A".
Transcript of Hearing. Volume IV. page 22. lines 10-1 ?. included herein as "Exhibit A"
6
Transcript o{Hi armg Volume IV. page ?9 lines 15-P included herein as Exhibit A"
' Supplementary Dec n c 01 Di\ oiu dated N\«\ cmber 22 1 ^9°
Supplementary Findings of Fact and Coni hoitm^ <r Law dated No\cmbc: 22 1UUL> SuppUnu mar [t(, u< of
Divorce, dated November 22. 1999
9
Affidavit of Craig Harris. 12/'2S/9°

THE

MAJOR

ACTIONS

OF

RESPONDENT

SINCE

TRIAL

TO

UNLAWFULLY

ADVANTAGE HERSELF IN OPPOSITION TO THE ORDER OF THE COURT ARE
ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS:
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
This Court did not award the Respondent a dollar value of approximately
$72,000.00, with respect to the two IRA accounts as she is claiming.
The Supplementary Decree of Divorce awarded the Respondent the following:
[A]ll remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above.
Therefore, Respondent is awarded property with a total value of S373.790.0010
Schedule A attached to the Supplementary Decree of Divorce places a dollar value of
$39,589.00, on Petitioner's two IRA accounts (i.e. Dean Witter 124-100296 and Prudential
Securities OUQ-R68840-41). The dollar value of $39,589.00, was used in the Court's calculation
when it awarded the Respondent property with a total dollar value of S373,790.00I ].
This Court awarded the Respondent a dollar amount of $39,589.00, with respect to the two
ERA accounts. Respondent is claiming that the Court actually awarded her a dollar value of
approximately $72,000.00, with respect to the two IRA accounts, and is attempting to transfer and
seize approximately S72.000.00, rather than the S39.589.00. awarded by the Court.:: This is not
what the Court au arded the Respondent

Suppicmeman Dec ice of Dt\ out paragraph u
Respondent's auard of propcn\ uith a dollar \alue o'S?~ v7M> 00 is cakulaicd h\ taking the iota! nci \aiuc on
Schedule A o\ S9"5.2~? 00 and then subtracting irom thai number i 1 • the. Commercial Building witr a dollar
amount of 5»425 1% 00. i2 • the Business unh ., Jollar amount of SM~.5?- 0r) jnu . ^. the Signui^ Retirement
account with a dollar amount of S2b 754 00
12
Affidavit of Ctuip Harris 12/2S'99 paragraph 5
11

If the Respondent is permitted to transfer and seize $72,000.00, the Respondent will
effectively be receiving property with a total value of $406,201.00, which is not what the Court
ordered.
Because the Respondent is claiming that the Court awarded her a dollar value of
approximately $72,000.00, with respect to the two IRA accounts, and the Decree of Divorce states
that the Respondent is awarded a dollar value of $39,589.00, Petitioner is requesting that the Court
revisit this issue.
POINT 2
The valuation of the real property in this case was inequitable.
During the trial on October 12, 1999, the Court stated the following:
THE COURT: So both of you understand, I'd be happy to hear your motions for
reconsideration. Today's not the appropriate time. We're going to get an order in
place and then we're happy to go ahead and revisit.13
Then again just prior to the conclusion of the trial, the Court stated the following:
THE COURT: Once I've entered that, I'll then direct one of you to prepare
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in conformance. And
then if you've
got motions to reconsider, then your timing would be appropriate.14
The Court ruled in trial that it would revisit the issue of the possible inequitable valuation of
the real property.15 Petitioner claimed in trial that the valuation of the real property in this case
was inconsistent. The value of the commercial building and the house located at 172 W. 9400 S..
Sandy. Utah, was based upon an appraisal done b\ Dave VanDremlin The respective values of
the remaining real property were based on tax assessments.
The Respondent was awarded all the real property with the exception of the commercial
building and the house located at 172 W 9400 S . Sandy. Utah It is inconsistent to value the
]

" Transcript <r Hiurui£ Volume IV pagi 22 imcs lt» I • inc luded herein a^ Exhibit A"
Transcnpf f)i Hainni; \ olumc IV pai'i '^ lines 15 ]" included herein a^ Exhibit V
J
* Transcnp' nf H<ci/nip Volume ]V pace 22 lines 10-P and page 39 linc^ 15-P induded hereir as "Exhibit
A".
14

commercial building and house on an appraisal and then value the remaining real property on tax
assessments. The Court recognized the inequities of allowing one piece of real property to be
appraised and not others, as evidenced by its ruling that it would revisit the issue once an order
was in place.'6
Because the value of the commercial building and house was based upon an appraisal and
the values of the remaining real property were based on tax assessments, Petitioner is requesting
that the Court revisit this issue and permit appraisals of the remaining real property.
POINT 3
The Court did not award the Respondent everything with respect to
the furniture and personal property as she is claiming.
The Supplementary Decree of Divorce awarded the Respondent:
[A]ll remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above.
Therefore, Respondent is awarded property with a total value of S373,790.0017
Schedule A attached to the Supplementary Decree of Divorce places a dollar value of
$13,395.00, on Petitioner's and Respondent's "Furniture and Personal Property." The dollar
value of SI3,395.00, was used in the Court's calculation when it awarded the Respondent
property with a total dollar value of S373/790.00.18
This Court awarded the Respondent a dollar amount of SI 3,395.000. with respect to the
furniture and personal property. Respondent is claiming that the Court actually awarded her all of
the parties* furniture and personal property which has a dollar value of approximately S40.000.00,
and all of Petitioner's personal belongings, even including Petitioner's own personal clothing.19

16

Transcript of Htannx. W»lunK !Y. pa^i- 22. i:nc> K>- ; ; and paL'c 3°. hno 15- i7. mJuJcci hcrcir, as "Exhibit
A".
Supplemental") Decree oi Di\^.r^- paragraph ^
ih
Supra Noic 1 1.
Affidavit of Craiy Hurris. ! 2'2h' og . paragraph fv i;».

It was never the intention of either party that the furniture and personal property listed in the
Schedule A include the Petitioner's personal belongings such as his golf clubs, clothes, suit cases,
hunting clothes, fishing tackle, toothbrush, etc.20 Nor was it ever the intention of either party that
the reference to furniture and personal property listed in the Schedule A include the parties'
personal property such as paintings, appliances, blenders, silverware, plates, decorations, etc.:i
The reference to Petitioner's furniture and personal property with a dollar value of
S5,000.00, was understood by both parties to be only the furniture and appliances in Petitioner's
apartment which he moved into after the parties' separation.22
The reference to Respondent's furniture and personal property with a dollar value of
$8,395.00, was an appraisal of only the furniture in the home located on Juniper St. The appraisal
did not include the parties' paintings, appliances, blenders, silverware, plates, decorations,
toiletries, etc.23
However, the Respondent is claiming that all of Petitioner's personal belongings and all of
the parties' personal property belongs to her pursuant to this Court's order.24 Respondent has
locked Petitioner out of all the real property and is claiming ownership to everything.25 This is not
what the Court ordered.
The Court did not award Respondent everything but rather awarded the Respondent a
dollar value of SI 3.395.00. which included only the furniture in the home on Juniper St.. and the
furniture and appliances in Petitioner's apartment.

:o

Affidavit
' ' Affidavit
~~ Affidavit
' * Affidavit
"4 Affidavit
25
Affidavit

of Craig
of Craig
of Craig
of Craig
of Craig
of Craig

Harris, 12C8/99.
Harris. 12/2S'99.
Harris 12/28/99.
Hams,12CS/99.
Hams, J2/2S/99.
Harris. 12/2S/99.

paragraph fr-10
paragraph 6-10
paragraph^
paragraph 10
paragraph 6-10
paracranhMO

Because the Respondent is claiming that the Court awarded her everything with respect to
furniture and personal property, and the Decree of Divorce states that the Respondent is awarded a
dollar value of 513,395.00. Petitioner is requesting that the Court revisit this issue.
POINT 4
The property division does not take into consideration payments
made by the Petitioner to the Respondent after January 26, 1999.
This matter was bifurcated on October 19, 1998. The Decree of Divorce was signed on
January 26, 1999, but was made effective October 19, 1998. To aid the Respondent until the
property settlement became final, Petitioner continued to pay $950.00 per month in support to
Respondent, Respondent's health insurance, and the interest on all the Respondent's loans
between January 26, 1999, and November 29. 1999, the date the Supplementary Decree of
Divorce was entered.26
The dollar value of these payments was not considered in the property division even though
the Respondent acknowledges receipt of these payments. The dollar value of such payments
should be subtracted from Respondent's property award of $373,790.00.
Because the Petitioner has made payments with a determinable dollar value to the
Respondent after January 26, 1999, and such payments were not considered in the property
division, Petitioner is asking that the Court revisit this issue.
POINT 5
In violation of the Court's Order, Respondent has refused to pay the
mortgage and the utilities on the real property she now occupies.
The Supplementary Decree of Divorce awarded the Respondent:
[A]ll remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above.
Therefore. Respondent is awarded property with a total value of S373.790.O0:"
:f

Affidavit <>1 Craig Hams. ]2/2S/^u. paragraph i I
" Supplemental-) Decree of Divorce, paragraph 9.

The award to the Respondent included the house and lot located at 692 S. Juniper St.,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the building and lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove,
Utah. With this award came the responsibility for the mortgage and the utilities. Respondent does
not acknowledge this responsibility and refuses to pay the mortgage on the home located on
Juniper St. and refuses to pay the utilities on the property located on Orchard Drive.28
Petitioner was contacted by the bank holding the note in the middle of November, 1999,
and informed that the mortgage was two months in arrears. Petitioner attempted to explain to the
bank that the property had been divided pursuant to the Supplementary Decree of Divorce. The
bank refused to cooperate stating that as long as Petitioner's name was on the note he was
responsible. Petitioner contacted the Respondent who refused to cooperate. To preserve his
credit, Petitioner was forced to bring the note current and then borrow 56,000.00, which he
borrowed in his own name and secured by the property, which he placed in an account with and
automatic payment plan. Petitioner also continues to receive the monthly utility bills for the real
property awarded to the Respondent.29
Respondent refuses to transfer the utilities into her name, refuses to refinance the house,
and refuses to pay the mortgage. As a result, Petitioner's credit is being destroyed which in tum is
jeopardizing Petitioner's business and preventing him from complying with this Court's order.30
At a minimum the Petitioner should be credited with any amounts paid to the Respondent or on her
behalf, against any amounts owed by Petitioner to Respondent.
Because the Respondent refuses to pay the mortgage, refinance the home, and transfer the
bills from Petitioner's name to Respondent's name, with respect to the real property awarded her
by the Court. Petitioner is requesting that the Court revisit this issue.
28

Affidavit ci Craif: Harris. MZh'^
paragraph 12-T
* Affidax it (J Craty Harris ) 2 ' 2 8 ' ^ paragraph 1 2 - T
30
Affidavit oi Craii: Hams 12/2SA>9 paragraph 12-17

:

CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant his motion for reconsideration and
permit the issues referenced above to be revisited by the Court.
Dated this 28th day of December, 1999.
Martin & Nelson
A Professional Corporation

D. Martin
Attdrney at Law

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the 28* day of December I served the following;
1)
2)

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OTHER RELATED
MATTERS,
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG J. HARRIS 12/28/99.

upon Bonnie Harris, the Defendant and Appellee, by placing the same in the United States Mail,
Postage pre-paid, and addressed as follows:

J. Grant Moody
J. Grant Moody, P.C.
336 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
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11

and would still

2

mechanism, whether it be through cash and/or property, is really what I

3

wanted some help with today. I've gotten very little help to this point, but.

4
5

proposed distribution schedules and-THE COURT: Anything you think would help me, I'd be glad
to hear from you.

8

91

her and under what

THE WITNESS: It may be helpful to go through these

6
7

Bonnie $204,242. Getting tha

THE WITNESS: Okay. Let me grab the documents that I

have.

10

THE COURT: So both of you understand, I'd be happy to

11

hear your motions for reconsideration. Today's not the appropriate time

12

We're going to get an order in place and then we're happy to go ahead

13 I

and revisit. But I've been through this once with Mr. Martin on another

14

case already. I'm a little short about it because it was not a pleasant

15

experience for me. I'm doing this again.

16
17

I don't want this case going into the same situation I had on a
prior case. We're going to get an order in place, then I'll revisit it.

18
19

THE WITNESS: Okay. I don't know which one you want to
start with.

20

THE COURT: Either, you just tell me.

21

THE WITNESS: Okay. If we look at Craig Harris's proposal,

22
23
24
25

the second page is probably the best place to start.
THE COURT- All of mine say "per Bonnie Hams." So when
you say CraigTHE WITNESS: That's his proposal. I'm note sure what that

make sure tha.

,e feels secured in taking that o.

natever else extra

penalties we can put in that as an exceptional order of support. But
something short of just a judgment which can somebody then just go out
and execute upon that and require immediate payment. That's the
difficulty. He doesn't have that right now.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take the matter under
advisement. I'll issue a written decision in regards to the attorney's fees
relating to the order to show cause, attorney's fees that each party
submitted in regards to the overall proceedings and the award of those
attorney's fees, the Norman/Loebbecke costs related to the late
compliance by Mrs. Harris, as well as the Norman/Loebbecke costs as
between the parties other than that aspect, and the division and most
importantly then, I guess, is the division of the properties in accordance
with the Court's previous order.
Once I've entered that, I'll then direct one of you to prepare
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in conformance. And then
if you've got motions to reconsider, then your timing would be appropriate.
Let's take these-we're dealing with complicated issues. It creates too big
of a mess to mix them. I want to do them systematically and one at a time
in accordance with the rules.
All right. Well, thank you both and than you for coming to
testify, as well. We'll be in recess.
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DATE:

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
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For the Plaintiff:

LOREN D. MARTIN
Martin & Nelson, PC
139 East South Temple, Suite 400
P.O. Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590

For the Defendant:

J. Grant Moody
483 West 30 North
American Fork, Utah 84003

1

PROCEEDINGS

2

Partial Transcript of hearing on March L 2000

3

3:18:27

4

Argument before the Court by counsel

5

3:53:29

6

COURT:

Well let me do this then. I'm going to recess and direct the parties

7

to meet together with Mr. Townsend for the next forty-five minutes

8

and attempt to identify the ambiguities that you see in the Order

9

and attempt to come up with stipulated resolutions of those

10

ambiguities. And I'm going to order you to both be in good faith in

11

trying to resolve this. I understand that you got disputes but let's

12

reduce the number of disputes. It's in your own interest. If you

13

want to appeal things that the Court did let's at least limit those

14

down to the things that are really in dispute. And if you can limit

15

these collateral issues you're going to have a lot easier time on

16

appeal, if nothing else, so that you can really work on the issues

17

you've got. Now two areas that I'm seeing with your argument.

18

What is the personal property that should be included within the

19

court's order? Why don't you have a discussion with Mr.

Townsend and yourselves in good faith and see if you can come to
some resolution there. And I'm going to ask you to be specific on
these items. Generalities are just going to postpone the dispute.
The other one is I can see is we've got this area of adequacy in
regard to the findings regarding alimony. Why don't the two of
you sit down and talk about that and see if we can't put findings
that are adequate regarding the court's position and then if you feel
that the court was wrong appeal the court's decision on what it
found.

But let's not have counsel prepare inadequate findings and

then claim that they are inadequate before the Court of Appeals.
That's a problem.
May I clarify? Well I don't know that the findings in there are
inadequate. My concern is that the Court of Appeals may say that
they are inadequate.
Well, why didn't you prepare adequate findings if you think that
they are going to say that?
Well, because, well...
I'm sitting here in back to back so that...
I mean that...

1

COURT:

I want to make a record of this. So I'm sitting here in back to back

2

jury trials. I just finished my seventh week and I've got another

3

one on Monday, going into my eighth week of consecutive jury

4

trials. Our trial calendars are incredibly harsh. And I depend upon

5

counsel to be officers of the court and to prepare these things and

6

to be cooperative. And I guess that" what I'm asking of you here.

7

There's a limit on what personal time and involvement I can give

8

you beyond the in-court time that we have and I hope you're

9

sympathetic to that. So I'm going to recess for forty-five minutes.

10

I'm going to let you do that. Let's see what progress we can make.

11

At a quarter to five I'm going to come back on and we'll put on the

12

record what it is and if I can enter some rulings on what's not

13

decided we'll do that. Thank you both.

14

MOODY:

Your honor could I give you another matter...

15

COURT:

And I've asked Shauna to stay in her just to make sure everything
stays orderly.

16
17

3:56:24

18

Court in recess

19

4:44:40

1

COURT:

Please, be seated. We're back on record in the Harris v. Harris

2

matter we have had a break here to allow parties to see what they

3

can stipulate to in terms of resolution of any perceived ambiguities.

4

Mr. Moody, has there been any resolution?

5

MOODY:

I think so. On the personal property (aside to Mr. Martin) - is that

6

agreeable then? On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take

7

what personal tools that she would like to have out of the shop by

8

the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have until that

9

weekend, I believe its the 19 of March, to remove the rest of the

10

possessions out of the shop.

11

COURT:

Ok, and that will resolve the personal property?

12

MOODY:

Yes. And then he will agree to pay her $5000.00 for the personal

13
14

property and he retains possession of all the personal property.
COURT:

15

When will the $5,000.00 be paid?
(Inaudible)

16

MOODY:

Probably the 19th

17

COURT:

I want a date

18

Mr. Harris

The only I would like to say is that if the weather is horrible...

19

COURT:

I want a date

1

Mr. Harris:

Well then give me 15 days so that if we have bad weather.

2

COURT:

All I need is a date.

3

Mr. Harris:

30, no I, talking.

4

MR. MARTIN:

Just give him a date when you can have everything removed.

Mr. Harris:

Excuse me — In having the material removed they're giving me four
days. If we have a major storm I want 15 days.

7

MARTIN:

Tell him that you want... Just give him a date so that he

8

Mr. Harris:

By the thirtieth

9

MOODY:

(to client) Ok?

10

Mrs. Harris

Ok.

11

COURT:

Thank you for your reasonableness. Ok, then by the 30th of this

12
13

month, March

MOODY:

And if he will just contact either me or if he could contact Mrs.

14

Harris just so that she can have the building unlocked when they're

15

doing that because it is secured. There is a lot of stuff in there.

16

4:46:23

17

COURT:

Ok. Is that your agreement on the personal property.

18

MARTIN:

Yes

19

COURT:

All-right, and yours as well ma'am?

1

Mrs. Harris:

Yes sir.

2

COURT:

I'll approve that stipulation. Til have Mr. Moody prepare it in the

3

form of an order. Which will amend the findings, conclusions and

4

supplemental decree to the extent this modifies it. So to that extent

5

the Motion for Reconsideration is granted to incorporate the

6

parties' stipulation. Other items that have been resolved between

7

the parties?

g

** *

9

End 4:58:00

10
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
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:

AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG HARRIS
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BONNIE HARRIS,
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:
:
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
SS.
)

I, CRAIG HARRIS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the Petitioner in this matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the information provided and statements made herein.

I am competent to testify and if called upon to testify regarding the information provided or
statements made herein, would state that they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
3.

I am submitting this affidavit in support of my MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS.
4.

Mr. Brad Townsend, CPA, with the firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates was

appointed by the Court to identify and value property.
submitted his report.

Mr. Townsend testified at trial and

5.

Real property listed in the Townsend Report included a large, three bay, double

garage-door, commercial-sized storage building on a lot located only yards from the our home in
Pleasant Grove. Photographs of that lot and building are attached to the Memorandum, as part of
"Exhibit F."
6.

Bonnie, other family members, and myself used the building for many years.

Boats and vehicles were stored therein along with the personal property of Bonnie, my brother, my
mother, my two sons, others and myself. We all used that building as a large, covered, secure
storage and work space. The building also contained heavy commercial steel shelving that had
been purchased by AID Equipment, Inc. Mr. Townsend's report listed both the building and some
large, high-value items of personal property stored therein as marital assets.
7.

The storage building and all its contents have always been accessible to Bonnie.

She was awarded the building and some of its specific contents that she listed as marital assets she
wanted. The court awarded Bonnie all her personal property. Bonnie has had the storage building
in her possession and control. Yet, never, until long after the trial did she make a claim against any
of the unlisted personal property in that storage building.
8.

The last day of trial was October 12, 1999.

9.

Bonnie only first raised her claim against the entire contents of the storage building

in March of 2000. Yet, the fact that she had taken all personal property from the building was
admitted in a letter dated March 27, 2000. A copy of that letter is attached to the Memorandum as
"Exhibit G."
10.

On December 28, 1999, I filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND

OTHER RELATED MATTERS. A copy of that document is attached to the Memorandum as
"Exhibit H." Hearing on that Motion came before this court on March 1, 2000. At that hearing,
the Court received a stipulation as to the division of our personal property.

11.

During the hearing on March 1, 2000, the Court ordered a recess to permit us time

to possibly resolve some issues. A copy of the Transcript is attached to the Memorandum as
"Exhibit I."
12.

During the recess, the parties agreed to the manner of division of the personal

property items in Craig's possession and items of personal property located in the storage building.
See Affidavit of Craig Harris, 10/17/00, attached hereto as "Exhibit J."

During the recess,

discussion occurred as follows:
a) Mr. Townsend said he had never received, nor had Bonnie ever provided, any
inventory or description of any miscellaneous personal property items located in
the storage building.
b) Bonnie had not previously made any claim against that property. She had never
made any claim that any of that property was marital property and had not
previously provided any list or inventory of the miscellaneous personal property
items to Mr. Townsend.
c) The Court Order was that Craig was to pay Bonnie five thousand dollars and
retain his personal property. The Court's Order stated that Craig and Bonnie
were to retain all of their own items of personal property.
d) Craig pointed out that he, his sons, his mother, his brother and Bonnie all had
miscellaneous items of personal property then located in the storage building.
e) Bonnie affirmed her claim that the Court Order was that she was given "all
remaining assets" not specifically awarded to Craig.
f) Bonnie said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his
personal property (bed, clothing, washer, dryer, personal items, etc.) that he
presently had in his apartment for five-thousand dollars ($5,000.00).
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g) Bonnie also said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his
personal property that was located "in the bullet room" of the storage building
for five hundred dollars. Bonnie then said that she recently had a person come
over and look at the stuff in the storage building. Bonnie then emphatically said
that Craig was "getting a real deal" if she let him have the stuff only in the
"bullet room" for five times five-hundred dollars.
h) Craig argued that the Court Order had awarded Bonnie forty thousand dollars
(purchase price) of personal property, furniture, fixtures, and furnishings in the
home for a value of only eight thousand dollars.
i) Bonnie said that what she needed from the storage building was some tools
that she required to take care of the yard, including the house and the storage
building that had been awarded to her.
j) It was agreed that Bonnie could take what tools she might need to take care of
the yard. She could take those items from the storage building and then Craig
would remove everything else to clean up the building for Bonnie's use since
the storage building had been awarded to her.
13.

The Judge came back to the bench and the following was read into the record:
COURT:

Please, be seated. We're back on record in the Harris v. Harris
matter we have had a break here to allow parties to see what they can
stipulate to in terms of resolution of any perceived ambiguities. Mr.
Moody, has there been any resolution?

MOODY:

I think so. On the personal property (aside to Mr. Martin) - is that
agreeable then? On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take
what personal tools that she would like to have out of the shop by
the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have until that
weekend, I believe its the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the
possessions out of the shop. [Emphasis added.]

COURT:

Ok, and that will resolve the personal property?
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MOODY:

14.

Yes. And then he will agree to pay her $5,000.00 for the personal
property and he retains possession of all the personal property.

The Court asked Mr. Moody to prepare the Order. The Order was signed by the

Court and filed on April 4, 2000. Paragraph two of the Order provided that I was to pay Bonnie
$5,000.00 for my personal property that I had in my apartment and all of my personal property
located in the storage building.
15.

Only three days later, Bonnie took action in defiance of the Court's Order. On

March 4, 2000, Bonnie apparently called the Pleasant Grove Police Department, claiming that the
storage building had been forcibly entered—burglarized some time between February 16th at 9:00
p.m. and March 4th at 2:00 p.m. A true and correct copy of the Pleasant Grove Police Department
Report, 03-04-00, case number 269335.A46, is attached to the Memorandum as "Exhibit L."
16.

Acting under the Court Order that I could remove my personal property from the

storage building between March 15 and March 30,1 found that the entire storage building had been
completely cleaned out. With the exception of one fishing tackle box and contents; large, heavy
gun safe; my son, Scott's Jeep; other Utah registered and serial numbered items; and some
miscellaneous trash; everything else had been removed.
17.

A series of photographs of both the exterior and interior of the building as seen then

are attached to the Memorandum as part of "Exhibit F." The photographs accurately depict the
condition and contents of the storage building at that time.
18.

After the police arrived, Bonnie came over from the house. She admitted that she

had taken everything. In fact, during the discussion that followed, Scott asked Bonnie why she
had also taken everything she knew belonged to him. Bonnie responded, saying "that there were
so many people helping her take things that she didn't know everything that was taken but that she
had told them to just take everything."

S

19.

An estimate of the value of personal property taken by Bonnie is now impossible to

compile because no prior inventory was made. Actual value of loss may double the estimates.
There were twenty-seven items of substantial value, estimated at $23,000.00, that Bonnie claimed
were "missing." From the nature of her words, tone, and actions, she clearly conveyed to us that
she was claiming there was a "burglary" so there was no way she could be responsible for the
property. Yet, Bonnie was the only one who had the key. She was the only one who had access.
20.

I had personally observed and recalled that eighteen of the claimed "missing" items

had been there just a few months earlier. At times I would believe that Bonnie and I were actually
on somewhat good terms. A few months earlier, there was no indication of any contest over the
stuff in the storage building. In any event, in addition to the "missing" items, we put together an
estimate, from memory, of what Bonnie had admitted taking and the estimated value. A copy of
the memory inventories and estimated values are attached hereto as "Exhibit 1." The estimate made
was a loss from:
a) Craig valued at $4,600.00;
b) AID Equipment valued at $2,925.00;
c) Dick (Craig's Brother) valued at $3,734.00; and
d) Troy and Scott (Craig's Sons) valued at more than $8,600.00.
21.

On March 20, I informed my legal counsel that property had been removed in

violation of the Order of the Court. I was told that a telephone call was placed to Bonnie's legal
counsel and a letter had been sent, confirming that telephone call.
22.

It being noted that the garage doors bore the label of Martin Door Manufacturing in

Salt Lake City, Vice President and the chief engineer for that company was contacted and agreed to
inspect the site. A copy of his affidavit and report is attached to the Memorandum as "Exhibit F."

fs

23.

The SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, a copy of which is attached to

the Memorandum, reflects that the Court Findings were that I held interests in two retirement
accounts:
a) The Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard, valued at $36,923.00; and
b) The Prudential Securities UQ-R62840 Simple IRA, valued at 2,666.00.
24.

The Court's valuation date was January 26, 1999.

25.

The Order of the Court directed that Bonnie would keep her own IRA with Dean

Witter, valued at $48,918.00. The Court then awarded Bonnie both of my IRA's, valued at a
combined total of $39,589.00.
26.

Bonnie and I continued to speak to each other often. During November of 1999, I

spoke with Bonnie about the transfer of my IRA's to her as Ordered. To my surprise, Bonnie told
me that her attorney was at that moment working on papers to transfer $73,800.00 from my two
IRA accounts, "as ordered by the court." At that time, I reminded her that the net sale value of my
IRA accounts on the date Ordered by the Court was only $39,589.00. Later, Bonnie said that her
attorney had told her that she could get the $73,800.00. Bonnie said, "and that's what I'm going
to get." The conclusion I made was that Bonnie and her attorney were planning on providing false
information to the Court about the additional Prudential IRA account that I had set up after the
Divorce. The Prudential IRA account I set up after the divorce was Account Number UQ-100296,
being my separate funds deposited after the divorce. I personally contacted Prudential and received
the report of the accounts upon which I made calculations of the values of each account. A copy of
that report is attached hereto as "Exhibit 2."
27.

AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW were entered on April 4, 2000. That final Order again recognized January 26, 1999 as
the valuation date of property.
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28.

During that interim time my automatic IRA retirement deposits had continued to be

made to the first IRA account. To maintain a proper accounting for the separate funds deposited
after January 26, 1999, I opened an additional account at Prudential, Account Number UQR82581, into which my separate personal funds earned after the divorce were deposited.
29.

Subsequently, in compliance with the Court's final Order, I instructed Prudential to

transfer Account Number UQ-R62840, the original ERA account, plus all accrued earnings from
January 26, 1999. By that time, the original IRA account had increased in value to $4,885.00.
That was the value that went to Bonnie when that account was transferred by Prudential to Bonnie.
30.

Bonnie had known that I had continued to make deposits to an IRA after the

Divorce. From what Bonnie said and how she acted, I continued to believe that there may be some
reconciliation. I told Bonnie about both IRA accounts and the money still being deposited.
31.

At a subsequent evidentiary hearing held on May 31, 2000, Mr. Charles A.

Schultz, Bonnie's counsel, misled the Court when he accused me of fraudulently manipulating and
attempting to conceal the Prudential IRA accounts. I have and hereby continue to flatly deny any
such allegations. Yet, based upon Schult's allegations and intent to mislead the Judge, the Court
directed Mr. Schultz to prepare an ORDER ON CONTEMPT. Paragraph 8 of that Order ordered
that,
The Prudential IRA, listed on Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce,
account # UQ-R62840, shall be provided and transferred to the Respondent, with
the money taken out and transferred to account # UQ-R2581 returned or
redeposited into account # UQ-R62840.
32.

The Court Order gave me twenty-one days to fully comply, setting a jail sentencing

day of June 21, 2000 at 10:30 a.m.
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33.

I immediately took action to transfer all Prudential IRA accounts to Bonnie,

understanding that I may be permitted to bring a proper accounting before the Court at a later date
should Bonnie or her counsel wish to pursue the litigation yet even further.
34.

In about the middle of November, 1999, I was contacted by the bank holding the

note on the home on Juniper Street. I was informed that the mortgage was two months in arrears.
I attempted to explain to the bank that the property had been divided pursuant to the Supplementary
Decree of Divorce and as a result I no longer owned the home and was no longer responsible for
the note. Of course, the people at the bank explained that I was still obligated on the contract.
35.

I contacted Bonnie and told her that my credit was being destroyed because she

would not pay the mortgage or the utilities. She simply ignored me and refused to cooperate.
36.

I asked Bonnie to transfer the utilities into her own name. She refused.

37.

Both prior to this final Order and after, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate

in or assist any court ordered transfer. Bonnie told me that she and her counsel were taking the
position that I had been Ordered to transfer all property and funds and that she had not been
ordered to help. In fact, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate in any manner to facilitate the
transfer. As an example, under IRS regulations, transfer of qualified retirement funds must be
made to a qualified account that Bonnie had previously established. But she refused to even call
Prudential to identify her own IRA account and ask that the money be transferred. She would not
assist in completing transfer of property as ordered by the court. She just kept saying that I had
been ordered to do everything without her.
38.

I even got a letter from Prudential that specifically stated that a request must be

made by "the receiving firm, accompanied by a Divorce Decree and appropriate signatures."
Bonnie refused to sign any papers or even request that the funds be transferred to her designated
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IRA account. A copy of that Prudential letter, dated April 28, 2000 is attached to the Memorandum
as "Exhibit O."
39.

Finally, in a letter dated June 5, 2000, Bonnie made it clear that I was to complete

all transfers totally by myself or go to jail on June 21.1 believe that Bonnie and her counsel's main
objective was to obstruct the transfer, making it impossible for me to comply with the Court's
Order.
40.

That refusal to cooperate stood in defiance of paragraph 18 of the Court's previous

SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, a copy of which is attached to the Memorandum as
"Exhibit D." That Order directed that,
Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and
personal property division as ordered by the Court.
41.

Bonnie's refusal to cooperate was also evidenced throughout the attachments to my

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE, dated June 14, 2000, page 2, paragraph 10; a letter from
MONY Life Insurance Company, received by fax and also dated June 14, 2000, and a letter dated
June 8, 2000 from Bonnie's counsel.

The Certificate of Compliance is attached to the

Memorandum as "Exhibit Q."
42.

From my IRA accounts, Bonnie took much more than the $2,666.00 allocated to

her by the Court. She actually took $4,885.00. Then by stratagem, Bonnie manipulated the Order
of the Court, making false claims after trial, obtaining an additional $

,292.39 over and above

what the Court granted in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce.
43.

The Findings of the Court were also that my life insurance policy, MONY Whole

Life 1347-24-19W, had a value of $16,042.00. The Court ordered that the policy be transferred to
Bonnie.
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44.

Given the time between the Divorce Decree and the final Order of the Court, I had

continued to pay premiums on that MONY life insurance policy as I had on the IRA, still thinking
that some reconciliation may be possible.
45.

I also continued to talk to Bonnie. We discussed the life insurance policy and I told

her that I had paid more money on the policy.
46.

The face amount of that life insurance policy was $150,000.00.

47.

The Court being informed that Bonnie lacked an insurable interest still ordered that I

transfer ownership to Bonnie, stating that the Court had just ruled that she did have an insurable
interest.
48.

Obtaining ownership of the policy, Bonnie told me that she had cashed in the

policy, receiving over $21,000.00 in exchange, thereby obtaining more than $4,958.00 over and
above the Court's order by taking all the additional cash value that I had contributed after the
divorce.
49.

At the hearing on June 21, 2000, the Court accepted my CERTIFICATE OF

COMPLIANCE that reflected that I no longer had any obligation to Bonnie. I had fully complied
and completed all required transfers.
50.

Over and above the additional funds that I had deposited to the IRA and life

insurance, Bonnie then also demanded an additional interest on all accounts and values of those
accounts from the Divorce date until the actual date of transfer. Bonnie's demand for such
additional interest amounted to a claim of $3,787.61.
51.

I could not see that Bonnie did anything to aid the transfer of property. But what

she did do was to mislead the Court by false accusations. Particularly, Bonnie damaged me when
she obtained ownership of the life insurance policy, as I am no longer insurable. That action taken
by Bonnie did much more damage than just the extra cash value she said she received.
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IRA Accounts:
52.

Bonnie refused to cooperate to effectuate the transfer of property. Bonnie told me

that the Court didn't require that she do anything to assist the transfer. Bonnie said that I had been
"ordered" to make the transfer, not her, and that I had to do exactly what the Court ordered without
her help.
53.

I personally provided all documents to Dean Witter and Prudential that I was told

were required to have the funds transferred. I was informed that the funds had to be transferred to
an account that Bonnie had created. Bonnie said that she told Dean Witter but proof of that was
never made and all information from Dean Witter did not reflect any instructions from Bonnie.
Boat Transfer:
54.

Bonnie and I purchased the Sea Ray Motor Boat from Garth Thurgood more than

eight (8) years ago in exchange for $17,500.00. Thurgood never asked for any more and never
made any claim against the boat.
55.

Bonnie already had the boat in her possession.

56.

I obtained and completed the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles papers that only

needed a police officer to drive out and check the boat and serial number. Bonnie refused to help
in any way. She declined or refused to ask a police officer to look at the boat.
57.

What she demanded was a bill of sale not just from me but also from Thurgood.

58.

I contacted Thurgood. Indicating to me that he knew that Bonnie had required that

Craig obtain a bill of sale from him, Thurgood said that he would only sign a bill of sale in
exchange for an additional $1,500.00.

A copy of the Thurgood Affidavit is attached hereto as

"Exhibit R."
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Signetics Retirement — Bonnie's
59.

The Court's Order was that the Bonnie provide me with information required to

prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, transferring one half interest in the Signetics account
to me.
60.

As of the date of the divorce the Signetics account had a net value of $28,754.00.

61.

Bonnie has failed to provide any information required by the Court's Order.

Return of Attorney Fees Claimed to pursue Order to Show Cause against Craig
62.

Given her total lack of cooperation to effectuate transfer as ordered by the Court I

believe that at least a portion, if not all of the attorney fees awarded on the Contempt charge be
refunded to me. Bonnie told me that Mr. Moody's legal fees for that matter was $1,900.00 but
that Schultz had made a claim of $8,000.00.

day of December, 2000.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this

Notary Public
Notary Public
A

LQREN0. MARTIN^,

\ o \ Ui» East South Ttmpie Suite 4001
Sdlt Lake City Utah 84111
My C o i n ission Expires
I
Januc ry 27 2004

State
of Utah
m m
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Exhibit 1

C!r*
DISCRETION

*V

MISC. RELOADING SUPPLIES
GAS CHAIN SAW (new condttkm)_
12 VOLT CHAIN SAW
120 VOLT CHAIN SAW
10 EACH BAGS OF LEAD SHOT

Q**0

2 EACH KEGS OF *4M & H380
MISC. TOOLS

T&fPT»)

MISC. CAMPING EQUIPMENT (PRESENTS)
MISC CAMPING EQUIPMENT

sssssssss

PURCHASE
DATE

300.00

VARIOUS

189 00

1985

13500

1993

140.00

1999

17.50 EACH

1994

100.00 EACH

1999

500.00

VARIOUS

400.00

VARIOUS

500.00

VARIOUS

fit^C*^**^~

4 OR 5 EACH HAND MADE KNIVES (IN TRAILER) g,^

fry/M

VARIOUS

PRICELESS

4 EACH BINOCULARS

450 00

VARIOUS

LEUPOLD SPOTTING SCOPE AND TRIPOD AND CASE

475.00

1990

SNOW SKIES

250.00

1986

1 CASE 223 AMMO

725.00

1999

MISC. PERSONAL ITEMS (cloths,coats,etc.)

777777

VARIOUS

BULLET POLlSHER(new in box)

100 00

1999

-^c—-—**-

TOTAL ESTIMATED MISSING GOODS

•77T/^

'*

OAJ

j

r*4»-r

«*>'

c**s

$4639.00

r*''*>k OF AJe

J

"£>\ok

1*

C&rfii<{$

sssssssss

; DESCRIPTK>NS

1

[2
p

t Appro* ftrdu**
>ac

51200.00

BLACK PUSH BAR

[400.00

[3988

12 LBS. KEG 700X POWDER NEW

| 144.00

1999

|

1

! 1988

TENSEN TRUCK WINCH ELECT

ii

170.00

PARCEL APPROX. 6 LBS KEG 700X POWDER NEW

4

brotUy

1 1999

J

1 1999

j

j

[PO.OO

H414 POWDER 8 LBS

|5

2 EA BRICKS OF REMINGTON 209 PRIMERS 10,000 each J 100 00 ea
b—i
| 60.00
J7 1 CASE OF WINDJAMMER WADS

| 1999

J8

J 80.00

1 1999

1

20 TO 25 BAG OF LEAD SHOT 25 LBS EACH

(l2.50 eft.

!l998

|

1 366 HORNADY SHOT SHELL RELOADER

| 390.00

! 1995

j

3988

j

!

| CASE OF FIGS WADS

[9

Uo

1

T1 1 LARGE COIL OF 1/4" NYLON ROPE APPROX. 1000 FT.
1

~^?(

_J

1 1999

1100.00
|

k
?^
p7

4

1

1

1

i

j

J

|

y i M P — | ^ — — •

•

—
f

AID EQUIPMENT MISSING PROPERTY UST
DESCRIPTION

|SSSSSSS

4 OR 5 TIE DOWN STRAPS

; 29.00 EACH

MlSC SHELVING PARTS(on floor under boat) / / # | J w k

\

) l l 500.00

| 6 EACH SHELVING UNITS 2,X8,X8, ASSEMBLED

[ 165.00 EACH

| 2 EACH SHELVING UNITS 18"X42,,X6, ASSEMBLED

| 145.00 EACH

1 TOTAL MISSING GOODS

| $2925.00

1

|

J g o r / Trou
#

[l
[2

DESCRIPTIONS

! sssssssssD_u

Bow hunting bow / case /arrowstaoad hcadsVrelease/equalizer

\ 1200 00

[4
js

1997-2000

j

800 00

1992-2000

j

400.00

1986-1990

j

1989-1990

|

BascbaHBasketball card collection
; Hunting Kmvet 2 each (Made by me in school metal dass)

1 Priceless

u

2 eachRange Finders Mine & Troys

(7

Kara's dutch over cook books and spatula

70.00

1s

Aqua Scooter

1400 00

[9
1 TO

J1996

^ 4 0 00ea

]

1999

[ 1991

_J

1 FM walkie Talkies (pair)

350.00

1998

J

j AM walkie Talkies (pair)

150.00

j 1994

J

???

| 1997

|

| 70.00

1994

|

n [ Power Too) given to me and my brother by my Grandpa

[12

|
*^

j! 300 00

j Myfishingtackle boxes 2 each

[3

1

1996-2000
1

Kanfishingtackle boxes 2 eachOrBsc suppiiesO

J

1 Lansky Knife Sharpening Set

ll3

Tire Chains For my old bronco 2 (1 pair)

90 00

1992

_j

114

2 cases of Chinese rifle bullets (approx. 3500 rounds)

400.00

1994

J

15

1-3/4 case 9MM pistal bullets (approx. 1750 rounds)

}6

I

' Misc. Reloading Supplies

In
118

1 Each leather Basket ball

' 1998 & 1999 |

140 00

I 1993-2000

i 4-800.00

J

35.00
75.00

1994

Unknown number of hand tools purchased over the years.

4-600.00

1992-2000

Battery new for nry boat in the camper

80.00

1999

J

290 00

1998

1

; 1 each scientific calculator

[19
{20
[2i

1

! 4 Wheder Winch brand new SQU in the box

j

122

Gun Case for 4 wheeler

125.00

1998

1

| 23

2 each file knives Scot and Tron

100.00 each ' 1992

j

[24

2 each _adle bags for 4 wheelers

[25

2 each fishing pole holders for my boat

[26

SawZaV in metal case,. grven from Grandpa

| 27

1 case 357 bullets

9000

3ea 1 lbs Cagt of RS pyrodex black powder

lSOOca

[ 1997]999

j

Black Powder gnu cleaning and pan tackle box

200 00

f 1996-2000

j

13O0ca

] 199&-S999

J

[ 28
[ 29

:

1 30

1 2 or 3 bncki of 22 bullet*

1 45 00 each
"
j
40.00 each

| 1997-1998
<
j J999

1 J80 00

j

TOTAL ESTIMATED MISSING PROPERTY | S8583 00

1997

j

J
j

1998

]

|

Exhibit 2

Retirement Account
or The Period:
.prill- April 30,2000
Phone 801-534-0088
Priced Securities Value
Money Market Funds
Cash Balance

$14,872 32
$246 DO
$5,214.22

E-mail Address:
Your Branch Manager:

201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, STE 160
P O BOX 45180
SALT U K E CITY UT 8414^0160
Jofinj* dutionQpcutec.oom
OARREU. L TROST

PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES C/F
MR CRAI6 J HARRIS
A I D EQUIPMENT SIMPLE IRA DTD

7/13/Ift
75 If 11*00
SSANDV

S

UT 8ND70-2k33

I...M.IU.I

HiilifliilUiiili M niiHiililfN

*^^W^^&i?it&H¥r^
2000
MATCHING CONTRIBUTION
L-T-D MATCHING CONTRIBUTION
SALARY DEFERRAL CONTRIBUTION
LIFETO-DATE SALARY REDUCTION CONTRH3

1999

$22200
$1.997 96
$1.00000
$9,00000

1

$1,196.78 1
$5,400.00

I

\sVISftA
QUANTITY

PRUDENTIAL MONEYMART ASSETS FUND

4,863

CURRENT
PRICE

CURRENT

1.000

H.86300

MONEY MARKET FUNDS

"V'^^A
E9TIMATED
ACCRUED

\t &*t*^ lil-00

f*~jL.

f

ESTIMATED
ANNUALIZED

I

CURRENT

$267

SJ9%">OwYieH

rji&xr&y

<4,W3.W

&"„**'
PRU MONEYMART ASSETS
AUTO SUBSCRIPTION

PI*****

DATE

TRANSACTION

0W3

Purchased

OUAMTITV

5,214

;

ilnvi

piffl<^

^c^^C_-

AMOUNT CRE0OEO

100

£ *>'/..**£-**

$5,21400

-f ^.7«-t
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•

IUUU

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

V-V-^oo ^ 7 )
J. Grant Moody, (6282)
J. GRANT MOODY, P.C.
336 West Main St.
American Fork, Utah 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-4181
Facsimile: (801)756-3940
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
BONNIE HARRIS,

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND OTHER
MATTERS
Civil No. 954402034 DA

Defendant.

Judge: Ray Harding, Jr.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 1,2000 on Petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration and Other Related Matters and the Petitioner Craig Harris was present and
represented by Loren D. Martin, of Martin & Nelson, P.C. and the Respondent Bonnie Harris
was present and represented by J. Grant Moody, of J. Grant Moody, P.C, and the parties having
reached a panial stipulation as recited to the Court and the Court, having reviewed the pleadings
and heard argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the
following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is granted as set forth herein.
2. The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15,2000 to select

.Deputy

and remove what personal property she desires to havefromthe building located on the Pleasant
Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the remaining personal property he desires out of the
building on or before March 30,2000. Any personal property left in the building after March 30,
2000 shall be the property of the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the
Respondent on or before April 4, 2000, for the personal property located in his personal
possession andfromthe personal property receivedfromthe building located on the Pleasant
Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot to the Petitioner from
March 16, through March 30,2000 upon the Petitioner giving Respondent 24 hour notice of the
times in which he intends on removing the property.
3. The parties have agreed and are ordered to submit Amended Supplementary Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to reflect specificfindingsmade by the Court at trial with
respect to Alimony and Attorney's Fees. Said Amended Supplementary Findings are to be
prepared by the Respondent's Attorney within 10 daysfromthe date of this hearing.
4. The Court clarifies it decision made at trial regarding the temporary support and debt
service payments made by the Petitioner to the Respondent after the Decree of Divorce was
entered and prior to trial and the entry of the Supplementary Findings and Supplementary Decree
in this matter. The Spousal support and debt service payments made by the Petitioner to the
Respondent after the Decree of Divorce was entered and made prior to trial were duly considered
at trial by the Court in its decision to terminate alimony and in not awarding Respondent any
attorney's fees, Norman/Loebbecke fees or other costs.
5. The Petitioner is permitted to pay the amount of $28,016.00, representing the amount
2

owing on the Bank One line of credit Account # 4262 0264 0104 2999 secured by the Pleasant
Grove Residence, and subtract said sum of $28,016.00fromthe amount the Petitioner owes to
the Respondent of $53,313.75 as set forth in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce, Paragraph

DATED this /

day offf/faffe 2000.

:OURT:

Approved as to Form:

Loren D. Martin
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /V^day of March, 2000, I faxed and mailed a copy by US
Postal Service, postage prepaid, the foregoing Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Other
Related Matters to:
Loren D. Martin
Attorney for Petitioner
P.O. Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

J. Grant Moony
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121003

PLEASANT GROVE POL1

6819

PLEASANT GROVE P.D.

Crime Repoi

DR# 00P0549
Report ID: 269335.A46
IN# 269335
Weapon, Force cr Means usedApparent MotiveLocation of Occurrence725 E ORCHARD

Report Date: 03-04-00

CODE - OFFENSE DESCRIPTION
2S10 Daaufcg* P r o p e r t y - P r i v a t e

OCC. ON:
OR BTWN:
EPORTED:

Date
02-16-00
03-04-00
03-04-00

Time
21; 00
14:00

Fi*i<a
SourceI F
Connecting reportsInvestigative divisions, units, persons notifiedADDITIONAL PEOPLE INVOLVED
CODES:

1
J

S=Suspact, V=Victim, W-V!ltQeas, C-Conplainant, F-Father, M-Mother

8

1115;
fft^Mr
. CSZ: Pi* GROVE,OT 84062

12-3:6^43
Aget-S6
Sex; P Race: W
Eth. tr
HP: 801 785-518^ WP:
testify:
DOB:
Age: OQ
Sex: M Race: tT
WP: ' HP:
Testify:

AKA; .
Kama: HARRIS, SCOTT
Addr:
CSZ: RIVERTON TJTAH
AKAr "

PROPERTY DETAIL
r Ouan Star. Article

Modal

Manufacturer

Color/Desc

Serial*

IBR Value
34

GARAGE DOOR

2C0.00

Total Stolen Property Value: .00

> Details are as follows:
On the afternoon of 3-4-00 I responded to 692 Juniper for a report
a burglary. I met with Bonnie Harris who owns a storage building at 725
:hard. She stated that someone had broken into her garage by pushing the
rage door in, breaking it off the track. She then stated she aid not know
anything was missing and it did not look like there was anything missing.
Sne later tola me a neighbor left a message on her answering
:hine a few weeks earlier, staging she saw a blue Bronco at this location
:e at night and it lo9ked suspicious. Bonnie stated her ex-step-son also
; a blue Bronco and did have some property in the storage garage.
The front of the garage did have somf blue paint transfer with a
ill dent. It appeared someone could have hit the aoor with a vehicle,
'ever at this time, it is unknown if anyone did make entry because nothing
>ears to have been moved or missing.

?#

CARSON, KEVIN
Date/Time Reproduced

aied to: P# Aeamt

Jomxt t o C/A

Reporting Officer(s)

Active

Other

P#

Rep. Off.

Asamt.

Signature

P046 PATROL
D-v/Cllc

Immediate F/'U

^Pending

To Wliorr.

.05/12/00

/""^

FRI 18:19 FAI 801 785 6819

PLEASANT GROVE POLICE

®004

, PLEASANT GROVE P.D.
teport
Crime Re
Report Date: 03-04-00

Report ID: 269335.A46

anti/wed. . .

This is all the information at this time.

DR# 00P0549
IN# 269335
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MARTIN & NELSON
Mission Statement.
To Protect The Famih ™

A Professional Corporation
139 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111-1161
Telephone" (801) 538-0066
Telefax (801)538-0073
ldmlaw@utw.com

Mailing Address
Post Office Box 11590
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84147-0590

FAX & US MAIL—URGENT
March 22, 2000
J. Grant Moody
336 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003
RE:

Harris v. Harris, Case No. 954402034

Dear Mr. Moody:
Two days ago when we spoke in the afternoon on the telephone there was substantial
disagreement and our clients' positions appeared to be at loggerheads. I then telephoned your
office yesterday morning, leaving a message with your secretary to see if some matters might be
resolved. This letter is sent in what may be a last ditch effort to resolve disputes before the
hearing tomorrow. At least before the hearing we should be able to agree as to what remains in
dispute. Pursuing that purpose I have made the following list. Please respond as to whether you
agree, disagree, or wish to add to the list.
1. Craig's Life Insurance Policy. I understand that it is Bonnie's claim that the Order
granted her more than the value of Craig's life insurance policy and retirement fund as of
the January 1999 Order. It appears that Bonnie claims that she was granted "title" and
the value of both items upon the date of transfer rather that as of January 1999. As
evidence of her claim Bonnie has made demand against Mony Life Insurance for transfer
of the incidents of ownership of the life insurance to herself.
The policy has a face amount of $150,000.00. In my morning telephone conversation
with you two days ago you acknowledged that Bonnie was only entitled to the cash value
of the policy as of the date of the January 1999 Order. I am suspecting that your position
on that still holds. However, Bonnie has apparently persisted in her claim that the
Court's Order entitled her to own and be the beneficiary of the insurance upon Craig's
life. In an attempt to clarify that matter I personally spoke to a Cheryl Smith at Mony
yesterday, telephone number 315-477-4493. Ms. Smith confirmed that she is holding
Bonnie's demand for transfer of title.
It must be noted that Bonnie no longer has any insurable interest against Craig's life.
Further, should he lose this policy he may not be insurable.
Craig\s Proposed Resolution: This office has requested that Mony Life Insurance provide
the "interpolated terminal reserve value" of the policy as of the date of the January 1999
Order. Immediately upon receipt of that information Craig will both borrow such amount

from the policy and deliver that amount to you as Bonnie's counsel. In the alternative
Craig will transfer such cash amount to you. Bonnie is not entitled to hold title to an
insurance policy on Craig's life. Bonnie is entitled to the money to be immediately
delivered. Please note that there is no other option. The January 1999 Order may not be
interpreted in any other way. Under long standing insurance practice and law no person
may obtain a life insurance against the death of another in absence of a demonstrable
"insurable interest."
Please immediately advise of your client's decision as to how she wants the money paid.
2. Craig's Retirement Fund, IRA: Our understanding is that we also had your assent that
Bonnie is entitled to the value of the IRA as of the date of the January 1999 Order.
However, since the January Order this matter has been continued through lengthy
process. During the last year the value has naturally increased and Craig has continued to
make contributions until the date your client would accept a full cash payment of the
value that was part of the Court's Findings in the January 1999 Order. At no time during
the past year has Bonnie been willing to accept any cash payment nor has there been any
request.
Craig's Proposed Resolution: Should Bonnie be willing to accept full cash payment of
the value of the IRA in accordance with the January 1999 Order, Craig will deliver that
amount to you as Bonnie's counsel.
Please immediately advise of your client's decision as to how she wants the money paid.
3. Items Taken from the Storage Facility: You will recall that at the last hearing Bonnie
represented to the Court that she needed certain tools and items from the Storage Facility
that were required to maintain the house and yard. In response to that request the Judge
ordered that Bonnie would have until the 15th last to remove those items and that Craig
would have from the 15th until the 30th. It is true that the Judge and your proposed order
do exactly state the words that she may "remove what personal property she desires."
However, that Order must be taken in context and and in compliance with the spirit and
intent of the Court's Order.
Both Bonnie and Scott were present when two Pleasant Grove Police Officers came to
investigate Bonnie's report that the Storage Facility had been recently burglarized and
Scott was informed that Bonnie had accused him.
Scott asked Bonnie why she would take everything that she knew belonged to him. Her
response was that there were so many people helping her take things that she didn't know
everything that was taken but that she had told them to just take everything. Bonnie told
Scott that she just didn't know what was taken.
During our morning telephone conversation two days ago you said that Bonnie took all
the things that she thought belonged to Craig. Bonnie and the person or persons helping
her took everything—even the heavy commercial freestanding steel shelving, a large
stack of commercial shelving parts, air compressors, bolt bins, etc. She also took all the
personal property located in the boat and the large fifth-wheel camper. After our

morning telephone conversation 1 personally went to view the site. The only thing of any
value that had not been taken was the large and heavy steel gun safe kept in the back
room. But Bonnie took everything; even the baseball card collection previously kept on
the very top of that gun safe was taken. With the exception of one fishing tackle box and
contents of about S300 value, the safe, Scott's Jeep and other Utah registered and serial
numbered items—Bonnie took everything. Why?
When I again telephoned you two days ago in the afternoon to report, you surprisingly
acknowledged that Bonnie had taken everything and that she would not return anything
unless Craig first provided a list. Bonnie was demanding a list of what Craig wanted
returned and proof of ownership. Given that there had been a burglary then Bonnie
would see what items she could possibly return. That position is not in compliance with
the spirit and intent of the Court Order. That position is also in direct opposition to your
own written proposed order.
Your written proposed Order states that Craig is to pay Bonnie $5,000.00, "for the
personal property located in his personal possession and from the personal property
received from the building located on the Pleasant Grove lot."
My client's position is that Bonnie has stolen property of value as to which she had
knowledge and thereby has obtained or continues to exercise unauthorized control over
property of another with intent to deprive another thereof.
Craig believes that in an attempt to cover herself, Bonnie provided false information to
the Pleasant Grove Police Department, claiming that the Storage Facility had been
recently burglarized. Bonnie then made the specific accusation to the Police that Scott
Harris had committed the burglary. There is no indication that Bonnie made any
inventory or list of what was taken.
In our conversation of the afternoon of two days ago you acknowledged that Bonnie had
taken all items that she thought belonged to Craig. You also said that she not only took
the large boat and the fifth-wheel camping unit but that she had taken all personal
property items that she determined were in any manner associated with the boat and fifthwheel and that Bonnie would "fight us" on that point.
Craig's Proposed Resolution: It is a criminal offense to provide false information to a law
enforcement officer. It is also a criminal offense to knowingly and unlawfully obtain or
exercise unauthorized control over property of another. Please refer to the criminal code
for definitional phrases associated with "theft."
Of course it is understood that in a domestic dispute there is rancor but that leeway given
in domestic matters does not excuse knowing criminal misconduct. Please be advised
that this office stands prepared to counter all of Bonnie's accusations against Scott and
Bonnie's accusations of burglary of the Storage Facility—beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consequently, in our telephone conversation two days ago and by this formal letter,
demand is made that all items removed be immediately returned without reservation and
that Bonnie inform the Pleasant Grove Police Department that any allegation she made of

a burglary was false. Craig does not intend at this time to pursue criminal prosecution
against Bonnie and those who aided or encouraged the crime she committed and the
accusation Bonnie has made against his son. Hopefully, this matter can yet be more
pleasantly resolved.
Please immediately respond in writing as to your client's position. Hopefully this entire matter
can be resolved before the hearing tomorrow. Can this matter be finally settled before court
tomorrow? It is sincerely hoped that neither this letter nor any other matters need to be brought
again before the Court. Please respond prior to 5:00 PM today.
Sincerely,

Lorfcn D. Martin
Attorney at Law

pc: Craig Harris
Scott Harris
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J. Grant Moody, U.S.B. #6282
Charles A. Schultz, U.S.B. #4760
AJtorney for Bonnie K Harris
P.O. Box 564
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 530-5636

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,

:

Petitioner,

:

BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.

:

ORDER ON CONTEMPT
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Civil No 954402034 DA
'i"iir",' Kr HMUJIM1 'I

—oooOooo—

The Evidentiary Hearing on the Respondent's Motion for ari Order
to Show Cause why the Petitioner should not be held in contempt for
violating this Court's orders set forth in the Supplemental Decree ui
Divorc- ..-'- • November 28, 1999 and tne Order Per-Motion for
Reconsideration and Other Matters, \ ht.-1i ei nafi. er, "t-h*=> Order c:r> Motion
to Reconsider") dated April 4, /000 came on for regularly scheduled
hearing on •..

, 2000, before the Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding Jr.

at 1:30 p.m. in the Fourth District Court, Provo, Utah, room 302. The
Petitioner was present at the Hearing and was represented by his
counsel of record Loren Martin•

The Respondent was present and

represented by her counsel J. Grant Moody and Charles A. Schultz.
The Respondent and Petitioner made opening statements and
thereafter evidence was taken by the Court*

The Court having heard

and considered the opening statements, having heard and considered the
testimony of the witness and having reviewed and considered the
exhibits admitted into evidence at the Hearing and now being fully
advised as to the facts finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the Petitioner willfully disobeyed the

Court's orders with full notice and the ability to comply.
2.

The Court finds that the Petitioner's contempt is evidenced

by his statement in court; and the Court accepts Mrs. Harris version.
3.

The Court finds the Petitioner's contempt is evidenced by

his letter he sent which indicates his refusal to pay unless certain
conditions of his were met*
4.

The Court finds the Petitioner's contempt is evidenced by

his failure to comply with the Court's orders.

-2-

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact and application of the
applicable law to those facts, the Court rules as a matter of law that
the Petitioner is in contempt of court•

ORDER REGARDING CONTEMPT
Based on the Court's Findings of Feu;t .-mc " ..nciurions --'i ."a* the
Court accepts the Respondent's position on each of the items as
outlined

her Evidentiary Hearing Brief provided to the Court and,

therefore, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:
1,

The Respondent is entitled to have the 1976 Sea Ray boat and

trailer, listed

•. Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce,

transferred to her either by title or bill of sale, it 5 t it i* cannot
be provided.
2,

The _2,teiw*sl Medical Stock, lifted on Schedule A of the

Supplemental Decree of Divorce and evidenced by certificate number
1025 representing 4,350 shares of Interwest Medical Stock, shall be
provided to the Respondent purs uan u 01 oaraQ raph number 18 of the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.
3,

The MONY life insurance account, listed on Schedule A of the

Supplemental Decree of Divorce, account n\ 3 mber 1347-24-19W, shall be
provided to the Respondent pursuant to paragraph number 18 oi the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.

-3-

4.

The deed to the Vernal property, listed on Schedule A of the

Supplemental Decree of Divorce, shall be provided to the Respondent/
or $5,000.00 shall be paid to her if title to the property cannot be
given free and clear, as demonstrated by a warranty deed or title
insurance.
5.

The $5,000.00 payment for the personal property, listed on

Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, shall be provided to
the Respondent pursuant to paragraph number 2 of the Order on the
Motion to Reconsider.
6.

The remainder of the $53,313.75, as provided by the

Supplemental Decree of Divorce, paragraph number 17, in the amount of
$15,297.75 shall be provided to the Respondent*
•^

7.

Post judgment interest at $3,787.61 shall be paid to the

Respondent.
^

8.

The Prudential IRA, listed on Scheduled of the Supplemental

Decree of Divorce, account # UQ-R62840, shall be provided and
transferred to the Respondent, with the money taken out and
transferred to account # UQ-R82581 returned or redeposited into
account #UQ-R62840.

9,

Attorney's fees shall be paid to the Respondent in

connection with these proceedings-

Counsel for the Respondent shall

submit affidavits setting forth the amount of those reasonable
attorney's fees.

-4-

10.

The Petitioner shall have two weeks, until June 14, 20CC, tc

purge his contempt by full compliance with all items, inducing
payment of attorney's fees.
11.

A sentencing date is set for June 21, 2000 at 10:30 £.m.

12

If there is full compliance the hearing can be canceled by a

stipulation of the parties that there has been full compliance and
that the contempt has been purged.

Otherwise, the sentencing will

occur.
13.

If full compliance has not occurred, the Court will enter a

sentence and it will be a forthwith sentence.
14.

The Petitioner is ordered to personally i,e Litit:/. d1: '• t

sentencing.
Dated this

day of June 2 000.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE RAY M. HARDING JR.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved as to form;
June

, 2 000.

Loren Martin
Attorney for Petitioner
-5-
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^Prudential
201 Sou* M i * 5t*fi S o ^ t t

P.0.fei«H

April 28, 2000

Mi Craig Hams

r : west 9400 south
Sandy, UT 8407C
Dear Mr Harris,
As per your request, a* of March 29,2000, in your Prudential Securities account, 0UQR62840, caih in the amount of $4, W3.00 has been available for transfer to new custodian.
Transferformsmmt bc;wbmmed by the receivingfirm;accompanied by a Divorce Decrpe
and appcopcute signatures.
Sincerely,

]^yr
Dancl Trust
Branch Manager
Prudential Securities Incorporated
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Charles A. Schultz
ATTORNEY AT LAWu
P.O. Box 654
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone (801)530-5636

^p?
^
*

me 5, 2000
oren Martin
[artin & Nelson
39 East South Temple
uite 400
alt Lake I it\, Utah K4i
e: Contempt of Craig Harris
>eai Mi M tin in:
I am mailing you the proposed order on Mr. Harris' Contempt Hearing, J. Grant Moody's affidavit of
ttorney's fees and my affidavit of costs and attorney's fees with this letter. Additionally, for clarification, I will
utline in this letter the things Mr. Harris must do by June 14, 2000 to purge himself of his contempt. If you do
ot agree with any of these items, please contact either J. Grant Moody or me. ¥ou can also contact Chris,
udge Harding's law clerk, at the Fourth District Court to view the tape of the Evidentiary Hearing to verify the
orrectness of any items in the proposed order. Chris can be contacted at 801.429.1077.
1.
Mr Harris must provide Mrs. Harris with some proof of ownership of the Sea Ra> boat and
railer, identified on Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, and some form of acceptable transfer of
ownership of the boat and trailer to Mrs. Harris. If in fact boats were not titled when Mr. Harris allegedly
purchased the boat and trailer, then ownership of the boat would have been evidenced by registration of the boat
n Mr. Harris' name. Please provide us with the last valid registration on the boat, title to the trailer (trailers
vere titled in 1976) and a copy of the bill of sale for the sale of the boat to Mr Harris
2.
Mr. Harris will also need to provide us with signed, notarized releases of any claim of interest
vhatsoever in the Interwest Medical stock from Troy Harris, Scott Harris and Louise Harris. Additionally, he
vill need to provide us with the signed and notarized documents transferring certificate #1025 and the 4,350
>hares of Interwest Medical stock the certificate represents to Mrs Harris
3.
Mr. Harris will need to provide us with signed notarized documents transferring ownership of the
VIONY life insurance policy to Mrs. Harris. The transfer documents must specify that ownership of the entire
policy and all amounts in the policy are being transferred to Mrs. Harris, not just a specified dollar value.
However, because the cash surrender value of the MONY account has decreased" due to Mr. Harris' failure to
pay the policy premiums and Mrs. Harris has been prejudiced bv his failure and refusal to transfer ownership of

the account in a timely manner Mr. Harris will have to pay Mrs Harris the difference in the cash surrender value
of the MONY account on November 28, 1999 and the cash surrender value as of the date he transfers the
account to her. The November 28, 1999 and the cash surrender value was $21,041.36.
4.
Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check in the amount of $5,000.00 for
the Vernal property. From your representations to the Court at the May 31, 2000 hearing, it is clear Mrs. Bench
is claiming ownership of the property and Mr. Harris has no valid deed to the property.
5.
Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check in the amount of $5,000.00 for
the personal property in his possession and for the personal property he and his sons removed from the storage
shed on orchard Drive.
6.
Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check in the amount of $15,297 75
for the remainder of the $53,313,75 he owes her pursuant to the provisions of paragraph #17 of the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.
7.
Mr. Harris will have to sign the notarized documents necessary to transfer all of the money he
removed from the Prudential ERA, account #UQ-R62840 to account # UQ-R82581 or any other account back to
#UQ-R62840. Thereafter, he will need to sign notarized documents necessary to transfer account #UQ-R62840
to Mrs. Harris.
8.
Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check injhgjamountx£$3?7 87.61
for the interest on the amounts he owes Mrs, Harris through May 31, 2000^Additionally, Mr. Harris^ill need to
pay Mrs. Harris interest in the amount of $11.82 per day until all of tl^eiransfers and payments have been
completed. Please keep in mind that interest is statutory and mandatory, it can not be waived, stayed or lowered,
and it applies to the total judgment.
9.
Mr. Harris will need to pay all of Mrs. Hanps attorney's fees^of $10,769.00 in full by Jun^H,
2000. These fees must also be paid by a cashier's check.
Please feel free to call either Mr. Moody of me if you n&^ag^questio^s.
Sincerely:

r
Charles A. Schultz
CAS/lbk
cc:

Bonnie Harris
J. Grant Moody

/:.
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MARTIN & NELSON
A Professional Corporation
Loren D.Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 E. South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsmilie: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Mr. Harris

IN THE FOURTH T1
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COT ^T v S T A T F OF I T AH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
v.

SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE
OF COMPI IANCE
Case No. 95-44-02034DA
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr.

BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent:

The Petitioner files this SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE for the
records of the Court in compliance w ifli the ( Hxlcr ot the (\uiit .it hearing held on April 4, 2000.
1.

Subsequent to filing the CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE a letter, raising a

question as to the proof of transfer ol Ihc YVi iml real property to Bonnie Harris was received.
2.

Attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference is the original "Owner's

Policy of Title Insurance" Policy Number 97098916, issued by United General Title Insurance
Company.
3.

Said policy states that the insured is Bonnie K. Harris.

4.

The policy states that "Title to the estate or interest in the land is vested in:

BONNIE K. HARRIS."
5

The title held by Bonnie K. Harris is "fee simple."

-- 1 ~ r o r»„

6.

The real property described is ten (10) acres of land previously owned by Joan M.

Bench, and is the land in question before the Court subject to the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce in the above captioned case.
7.

The Order of the Court was that said land be transferred to Bonnie K. Harris.

8.

Said Policy of Title Insurance is in the amount of $5,000.00. That value is

consistent with the value determined by the Court as set forth in the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby again certified that Craig Harris has complied with the Order
of the Court that required transfer of property. Neither this Certificate or any transfer shall
constitute a waiver of any right to subsequently petition the Court for approval of an accounting
and reimbursement of value transferred in excess of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce or
appeal.
Either party may submit the question of accounting, requesting an audit and report from
Norman/Loebbecke Associates. The valuation date established in the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce is January 26, 1999. It is anticipated that the parties may resolve questions of
accounting without necessity of court intervention.
DATED this 20th day of June 2000.
MARTIN & NELSON, PC
Counsel for Craig Harris

\y

/Ljfiren D. Martin^
Attorney at Law

r>~— i ~ ^ o n ~

Acknowledged as Received:
•J. Grant Moody
Counool foi Duuiiii I Ion is
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby Certify that a copy of the within SUPPLEMENTARY CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLIANCE was hand delivered to the offices of J. Grant Moody, 36 West Main Street,
American Fork, UT 84003 on June 20, 2000.
y^2^

<o

n D. Martin

P a ere* *\ r\f

^ Paar*=»c

OWNER'S POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE
Issued by

Policy O

N
UNITED GENERAL
°- 97098916
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE
CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS, UNITED GENERAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Louisiana corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in
Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, sustained or incurred
by the insured by reason of:
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested other than as stated therein;
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title;
3. Unmarketability of the title;
4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land.

The Company also will pay the costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in defense of the title, as insured,
but only to the extent provided in the Conditions and Stipulations.
This policy shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by either a duly authorized agent or representative
of the Company and Schedule A and B have been attached hereto.
In Witness Whereof, United General Title Insurance Company has caused its corporate name to be hereunto
affixed by its duly authorized officers as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A.

UNITED GENERAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

<

Z&&b~irir

\)

Presic
President

y^pzz&A^
Secretary

Countersigned.
Authorized Officer or Agent

} " L U S I O I N 5 KKUIVl t U Y L J V A U I .
olio wing matters arc expressly excluded from the covers^ of this policy and
lpany will not pay loss or damage, costs, attorneys' fees o expenses which
reason of:
ny law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including bu. a limited to
I and zoning laws, ordinances, or regulations) restricting, regulaui prohibiting
ing to (i) the occupancy, use, or enjoyment of the land; (ii) th character,
ion or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on th*. ]and; (iii)
ation in ownership or a change in the dimensions or area of the la; or any
)f which the land is or was a part; or (iv) environmental protection, or U effect
violation of these laws, ordinances or governmental regulations, except o the
that a notice of the enforcement thereof or a notice of a defect, lie. or
brance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has
zcorded in the public records at Date of Policy.
ny governmental police power not excluded by (a) above, except to the extent
notice of the exercise thereof or a notice of a defect, lien or encumbrance
ng from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has been recorded in
blic records at Date of Policy.
hts of eminent domain unless notice of the exercise thereof has been recorded
public records at Date of Policy, but not excluding from coverage any taking
has occurred prior to Date of Policy which would be binding on the rights of
ihaser for value without knowledge.

3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, auverse claims or other matters:
(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant;
(b) not known to the Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy,
but known to the insured claimant and not disclosed in writing to the Company by the
insured claimant prior to the date the insured claimant became an insured under this
policy;
(c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant;
(d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy; or
(e) resulting in loss or damage which would not have been sustained if the insured
claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy.
4. Any claim, which arises out of the transaction vesting in the Insured the estate or
interest insured by this policy, by reason of the operation of federal bankruptcy, itate
insolvency, or similiar creditors' rights laws, that is based on:
(a) the transaction creating the estate or interest insured by this policy being
deemed afraudulentconveyance orfraudulenttransfer, or
(b) the transaction creating the estate or interest insured by this policy being
deemed a preferential transfer except where the preferential transfer results
from the failure:
(i) to timely record the instrument or transfer, or
(ii) of such recordation to impart notice to purchaser for value or a
judgement or lien creditor.

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
FINITION OF TERMS.
following terms when used in this policy mean:
'insured": the insured named in Schedule A, and , subject to any rights or
ses the Company would have had against the named insured, those who succeed
; interest of the named insured by operation of law as distinguished from
iase including, but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors,
>nal representatives, next of kin, or corporate or fiduciary successors,
'insured claimant*': an insured claiming loss or damage,
''knowledge" or "known**: actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or
e which may be imputed to an insured by reason of the public records as defined
is policy or any other records which impart constructive notice of matters
ting the land.
"land**: the land described or referred to in Schedule A or C, and improvements
>ed thereto which by law constitute real property. The term "land** does not
jde any property beyond the lines of the area described or referred to in Schedule
r C, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting streets, roads,
lues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit
extent to which arightof access to and from the land is insured by this policy,
i "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trustdeed, or other security instrument
"public records": records established under state statutes at Date of Policy for
purpose of imparting constructive notice of matters relating to real property to
chasers for value and without knowledge. With respect to Section 1 (aXiv) of the
fusions From Coverage, "public records" shall also include environmental
tection liens filed in the records of the clerk of the United States district court for
district in which the land is located.
;) "unmarketability of the title": an alleged or apparent matter affecting the title
he land, not excluded or exceptedfromcoverage, which would entitle a purchaser
the estate or interest described in Schedule A to be released from the obligation to
rchase by virtue of a contractual condition requiring the delivery of marketable
e.
CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER CONVEYANCE OF TITLE.
lie coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of
insured only so long as the insured retains an estate or interest in the land, or holds
i indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser from
e insured, or only so long as the insured shall have liability by reason of covenants
warranty made by the insured in any transfer or conveyance of the estate or interest
[lis policy shall not continue in force in favor of any purchaserfromthe insured of
ther (i) an estate or interest in the land, or (ii) an indebtedness secured by a purchase
loney mortgage given to the insured.
. NOTICE OF CLAIM TO BE GIVEN BY INSURED CLAIMANT.
The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (i) in case of any litigation
i set forth in Section 4(a) below, (ii) in case knowledge shall come to an insured
ereunder of any claim of title or interest which is adverse to thetitleto the estate or
nterest, as insured, and which might cause loss or damage for which the Company
nay be liable by virtue of this policy, or (iii) iftitleto the estate or interest, as insured,
s rejected as unmarketable. If prompt notice shall not be given to the Company, then
is to the insured all liability of the Company shall terminate with regaid to the matter
x matters for which prompt notice is required; provided, however, that failure to
notify the Company shall in no case prejudice therightsof ar insured under mis
- i — .u. o
«„,„ .Kan x* nreiudiced bv the failure and then only to the

4. DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION OF ACTIONS: DUTY OF INSURED
CLAIMANT TO COOPERATE.
(a) Upon written request by the insured and subject to the options contained in
Section 6 of these Conditions and Stipulations, the Company, at its own cost and
without unreasonable delay, shall provide for the defense of an insured in litigation
in which any third party asserts a claim adverse to thetitleor interest as insured, but
only as to those stated causes of action alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other
matter insured against by this policy. The Company shall have the right to select
counsel of its choice (subject to therightof the insured to object for reasonable cause)
to represent the insured as to those stated causes of action and shall not be liable for
and will not pay the fees of any other counsel. The Company will not pay any fees,
costs or expenses incurred by the insured in the defense of those causes of action
which allege matters not insured against by this policy.
(b) The Company shall have theright,at its own cost, to institute and prosecute any
action or proceeding or to do any other act which in its opinion may be necessary or
desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest, as insured, or to prevent or
reduce loss or damage to the insured. The Company may take any appropriate action
under the terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable hereunder, and shall
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. If the Company
shall exercise itsrightsunder this paragraph, it shall do so diligently.
(c) Whenever the Company shall have brought an action or interposed a defense as
required or permitted by the provisions of this policy, the Company may pursue any
litigation to final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction and expressly
reserves theright,in its sole discretion, to appealfromany adverse judgment or order.
(d) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company to prosecute or
provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, the insured shall secure to the
Company the right to so prosecute or provide defense in the action or proceeding, and
all appeals therein, and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of the
insured for this purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, the insured, at the
Company's expense, shall give the Company all reasonable aid (i) in any action or
proceeding, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, prosecuting or defending the
action or proceeding, or effecting settlement, and (ii) in any other lawful act which
in the opinion of the Company may be necessary or desirable to establish the title to
the estate or interest as insured. If the Company is prejudiced by the failure of the
insured to furnish the required cooperation, the Company's obligations to the insured
under the policy shall terminate, including any liability or obligation to defend,
prosecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter or matters requiring
such cooperation.
5. PROOF OF LOSS OR DAMAGE.
In addition to and after the notices required under Section 3 of these Conditions and
Stipulations have been provided the Company, a proof of lots or damage signed and
sworn to by the insured claimant shall be furnished to the Company within 90 days
after the insured claimant shall ascertain the facts giving rite to the lots or damage.
The proof of lots or damage shall describe the defect in, or lien or encumbrance on
the title, or other matter insured against by this policy which constitutes the basis of
lots or damage and shall state, to the extent possible, the basis of calculating the
amount of the lots or damage. If the Company is prejudiced by the failure of the
insured claimant to provide the required proof of loss or damage, the Company's
obligations to the insured under the policy shall terminate, including any liability or
obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter

UHITED GENERAL TITLE IHSURAMC* COMPAHY
OWNER'S POLICY
SCHEDULE A
Policy N o . :
97098916

Effective Date of Policy:
June 2 0 , 2000 at 9:11 A . M .

Commitment N o . :
Policy:
00V9542U
Insurance:

1.

Simultaneous Issue w i t h :

Premium:
$200.00
Reissue of Policy: N o . :

Amount of Insurance:
$5,000.00
Reissue

Amount of
Company N a m e :

Name of Insured:
BONNIE K. HARRIS

2.

The estate or interest in t h e land described in this Schedule and which is
covered by this policy:
FEE SIMPLE

3.

T i t l e t o the e s t a t e or i n t e r e s t i n the land i s v e s t e d i n :
BONNIE K. HARRIS

4.

The land referred t o i n t h i s p o l i c y i s s i t u a t e d i n t h e S t a t e of Utah,
County of UINTAH and i s d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s or i n Schedule C.
The Northeast quarter of t h e Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of
S e c t i o n 2 2 , Township 6 South, Range 19 East, S a l t Lake Base 6 Meridian.

Authorized countersignature
Valid only i f attached t o ALTA Ovraer's POLICY - (4-6-90) and Schedule B - of United General T i t l e
Insurance Company
ALTA Owner's P o l i c y ( 4 - 6 - 9 0 )
UGT Form 352
Prepared atx Town & Country Title, Inc.
P.O. Box 1530
Vernal, Utah 84078

UNITED GENERAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
OWNER'S POLICY
SCHEDULE B
EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE
Policy No.: 97098916
This policy does not Insure against loss or damage and the Company will not pay
costs, attorney's fees or expenses which arise by reason of:
1.

The lien of the General Taxes for the year 2000 and thereafter which are
not yet due and payable.

2.

Any lien, or right to a lien for services, labor or material heretofore or
hereafter furnished, imposed by law and not shown by the public records.

3.

Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records.

4.

Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, encroachments,
easements, variations in area or content, party walls and/or any
facts that a correct survey and/or physical inspection of he
premises would disclose.

5.

All assessments and taxes for the year 2000 and all subsequent years.

6.

Taxes for the year 2000 and thereafter. Serial No. 07-010-0006 (1). (Taxes
for the year 1999 in the amount of $30.75 have been paid).

7.

Said property is included within the boundaries of The Uintah Water
Conservancy District, The Central Utah Water Conservancy District, The
Uintah Recreation Special Service District, Uintah County District and
The Uintah County Mosquito Abatement District assessments for which are
collected with the general taxes.

8.

Any service, installation, connection, maintenance or construction charges
for sewer, water, electricity, or garbage collection or disposal or other
utilities unless shown as an existing lien by the public records.

9.

All oil, gas, mineral and pertaining easement rights or other matters
relating thereto, whether expressed or implied.

10.

The land described in Schedule A hereof does not from on a publicly
dedicated road. THE COMPANY DOES NOT INSURE A LEGAL RIGHT OP ACCESS
FOR INGRESS AND EGRESS TO SAID LAND.

11.

Rights of Way for any roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines
now existing over, under or across said land.

12.

Reservations in the Patent from the United States to Eiren Ray
Kimball, recorded January 20, 1927 in Book 26 at page 91 of official
records as follows: EXCEPTING and reserving also to the United
States all oil and gas in the lands so patented, and to it, or
persons authorized by it, the right to prospect for, mine, and
remove such deposits from the same upon compliance with the
conditions and subject to the provisions and limitations of the Act
of July 12, 1914 (38 Stat.509).
This entry is made under Section 29 of the Act of February 25, 1920
(41 Stat. 437) and the patent is issued subject to the rights of
prior permittees or lessees to use so much of the surface of the
South half of the Northeast quarter of said Section Twenty-two, as
is required for mining operations, without compensation to the
patentee for damages resulting from proper mining operations.

Valid only if attached to ALTA Owner's POLICY -(4-6-90) and Schedule A - of United General Title
Insurance Company.
ALTA Owner's Policy-(4-6-901
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Conditions and^Stlpulations (Continued)
Edition, the Insured claimant may reasonably be required to submit to examination
r oath by any authorized representative of the Company and shall produce for
unation, inspection and copying, at such reasonable times and places as may be
jnited by any authorized representative of the Company, all records, books,
crs, checks, correspondence and memoranda, whether bearing a date before or
Date of Policy, which reasonably pertain to the loss or damage. Further, if
ested by any authorized representative of (he Company, the insured claimant
[ grant its permission, in writing, for any authorized representative of the
ipany to examine, inspect and copy all records, books, ledgers, checks,
espondence and memoranda in the custody or control of a third party, which
onably pertain to the loss or damage. All information designated as confidential
tie insured claimant provided to the Company pursuant to this Section shall not
lisclosed to others unless, in the reasonable judgment of the Company, it is
sssary in the administration of the claim. Failure of the insured claimant to submit
examination under oath, produce other reasonably requested information or grant
nission to secure reasonably necessary informationfromthird parties as required
us paragraph shall terminate any liability of the Company under this policy as to
claim.
OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE SETTLE CLAIMS: TERMINATION
LIABILITY.
case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall have the following additional
ions:
) To Pay or Tender Payment of the Amount of Insurance.
3 pay or tender payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together with
r costs, attorneys* fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant, which were
horized by the Company, up to the time of payment or tender of payment and which
Company is obligated to pay.
pon the exercise by the Company of this option, ail liability and obligations to the
ured under this policy, other than to make the payment required, shall terminate,
:luding any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation,
d the policy shall be surrendered to the Company for cancellation.
:>) To Pay or Otherwise Settle With Parties Other than the Insured or With the
sured Claimant
i) to pay or otherwise settle with other parties for or in the name of an insured
limant any claim insured against under this policy, together with any costs,
orneys* fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant which were authorized
' the Company up to the time of payment and which the Company is obligated to
»y;or
ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss or damage provided
>r under this policy, together with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred
f the insured claimant which were authorized by the Company up to the time of
iyment and which the Company is obligated to pay.
Upon the exercise by the Company of either of the options provided for in
aragraphs (b)(i) or (ii), the Company's obligations to the insured under this policy
w the claimed loss or damage, other than the payments required to be made, shall
irminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute or continue any
tigation.
. DETERMINATION, EXTENT OF LIABILITY AND COINSURANCE.
This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage
ustained or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by
eason of matters insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein
lescribed.
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall not exceed the least of:
(i) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A; or,
(ii) the difference between the value of the insured estate or interest as insured and
he value of the insured estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance
insured against by this policy.
(b) In the event the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A at the Date of Policy
is less than 80 percent of the value of the insured estate or interest, or if subsequent
to the Date of Policy an improvement is erected on the land which increases the value
of the insured estate or interest by at least 20 percent over the Amount of Insurance
stated in Schedule A, then this policy is subject to the following:
(i) where no subsequent improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the
Company shall only pay the loss pro rata in the proportion that the amount of
insurance at Date of Policy bears to the total value of the insured estate or interest at
Date of Policy; or
(ii) where a subsequent improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the
Company shall only pay the pro rau in the proportion that 120 percent of the Amount
of Insurance stated in Schedule A bears to the sum of the Amount of Insurance stated
in Schedule A and the amount expended for the improvement
•;
~* »u:- «.«„
K .Kail nnt armiv to costs, attomevs* fees and

Insurance stated in Schedule A
(c) The Company will pay only those costs, attorneys' feet and expense* incurred
in accordance with Section 4 of these Conditions and Stipulations.
S. APPORTIONMENT.
If the land described in Schedule A or C consists of two or more parcels which are
not used as a single site, and loss is established affecting one or more of the parcels
but not all, the loss shall be computed and settled on a pro rau basis as if the amount
of insurance under this policy was divided pro rau as to the value on Date of Policy
of each separate parcel to the whole, exclusive of any improvements made subsequent
to Date of Policy, unless a liability or value has otherwise been agreed upon as to each
parcel by the Company and the insured at the time of the issuance of this policy and
shown by an express statement or by an endorsement attached to this policy.
9. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
(a) If the Company establishes the title, or removes the alleged defect, lien or
encumbrance, or cures the lack of a right of access to or from the land, or cures the
claim of unmarkeubility oftitle,all as insured, in a reasonably diligent manner by any
method, including litigation and the completion of any appeals therefrom, it shall
have fully performed its obligations with respect to that manner and shall not be liable
for any loss or damage caused thereby.
(b) In the event of any litigation, including litigation by the Company or with the
Company's consent, the Company shall have no liability for loss or damage until
there has been a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and
disposition of all appeals therefrom, adverse to the title as insured.
(c) The Company shall not be liable for loss or damage to any insured for liability
voluntarily assumed by the insured in settling any claim or suit without the prior
written consent of the Company.
10. REDUCTION OF INSURANCE: REDUCTION OR TERMINATION OF
LIABILITY:
All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs, attorneys' fees and
expenses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro Unto.
11. LIABILITY NONCUMULATIVE.
It is expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall be
reduced by any amount the Company may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage
to which exception is taken in schedule B or to which the insured has agreed, assumed,
or taken subject, or which is hereafter executed by an insured and which is a charge
or lien on the esute or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and the amount
so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy to the insured owner.
12. PAYMENT OF LOSS.
(a) No payment shall be made without producing this policy for endorsement of the
payment unless the policy has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of loss or
destruction shall be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company.
(b) When liability and the extent of loss or damage has been definitely fixed in
accordance with these Conditions and Stipulations, the loss or damage shall be
payable within 30 days thereafter.
13. SUBROGATION UPON PAYMENT OR SETTLEMENT.
(a) The Company's Right of Subrogation.
Whenever the Company shall have settled and paid a claim under this policy, all
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of the insured
claimant
The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to allrightsand remedies which
the insured claimant would have had against any person or property in respect to the
claim had this policy not been issued. If requested by the Company, the insured
claimant shall transfer to the Company allrightsand remedies against any person or
property necessary in order to perfect this right of subrogation. The insured claimant
shall permit the Company to sue, compromise or settle in the name of the insured
claimant and to use the name of the insured claimant in any transaction or litigation
involving theserightsor remedies.
If a payment on account of a claim does not fully cover the loss of the insured
claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to these rights and remedies in the
proportion which the Company's payment bears to the whole amount of the loss.
If loss should result from any act of the insured claimant, as stated above, that act
shall not void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be required to pay only
that part of any losses insured against by this policy which shall exceed the amount,
if any, lost to the Company by reason of the impairment by the insured claimant of
the Company's right of subrogation.
(b) The Company's Right Against Non-insured Obligors.
The Company's right of subrogation against non-insured obligors shall exist and
shall include, without limitation, therightsof the insured to indemnities, guaranties,
other policies of insurance or bonds, notwithstanding any terms or conditions
contained in those instruments which provide for subrogation rights by reason of this

Unless prohibited by applicable law, either th ompany or the insured may
demand arbitration pursuant to the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Arbitrable matters may include, but are not limited to, any
controversy or claim between the Company and the insured arising out of or relating
to this policy, any service of the Company in connection with its issuance or the
breach of a policy provision or other obligation. All arbitrable matters when the
Amount of Insurance is $1,000,000 or less shall be arbitrated at the option of either
the Company or the insurecL All arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance
is in excess of $1,000,000 shall be arbitrated only when agreed to by both the
Company and the insured. Arbitration pursuant to this policy and under the Rules in
effect on the date the demand for arbitration is made or, at the option of the insured,
the Rules in effect at Date of Policy shall be binding upon the parties. The award may
include attorneys* fees only if the laws of the state in which the land is located permit
a court to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. Judgment upon the award
rendered by the Arbitrators) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
The law of the situs of the land shall apply to an arbitration under the Title Insurance
Arbitration Rules.
A copy of the Rules may be obtained from the Company upon request

15. LIABILITY LIMIT 1
0 THIS POLICY: POLICY ENTIRE
CONTRACT.
(a) This policy together with all endorsements, if any, attached hereto by the
Company is the entire policy and contract between the insured and the Company, hi
interpreting any provision of this policy, this policy shall be construed as a whole.
(b) Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and which
arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or by any
action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to this policy.
(c) No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by a writing;
endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President, a Vice President
the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer or authorized signatory of
the Company.
16. SEVERABILITY.
In the event any provision of the policy is held invalid or unenforceable under
applicable law, the policy shall be deemed not to include that provision and all other
provisions shall remain in full force and effect
17. NOTICE, WHERE SENT.
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in writing required
to be furnished the Company shall include the number of this policy and shall be
addressed to the Company at P.O. Box 1591, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821.
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MARTIN & NELSON
A Professional Corporation

Loren D. Martin (2101)
Mail:
PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Mr. Harris

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah, 84601
CRAIG JACK HARRIS
Petitioner,
v.

BILL OF SALE OF:
ONE 1978 Sea Ray Boat

BONNIE HARRIS
Respondent.

Case No:
Judge:

95-44-02034DA
Ray M. Harding, Jr.

In accordance with the Order of the above court, Craig Jack Harris hereby transfers all
right, title and interest in and to one 1978, 26 foot, Sea Ray Motor Boat, serial number
SERA0852A1077-260SDA758-8, including the accompanying trailer, are hereby and forthwith
transferred in place to Bonnie Harris. Bonnie Harris provided the serial number. Mr. Harris
warrants title to both the boat and the trailer. It is not believed that the trailer has a serial number.
Both the Boat and Trailer are presently in possession of Bonnie Harris.
DATED this

TS

day of June, 2000

WAT

C r a i (Wrapt HarriQ

CraiiKfack Harris
Subscribed and Sworn to before me on the

o

day of June, 2000.

s-7

Notai

LORE^D^ARtWotary Public /
Salt U*£ City, Utah 84111
My Commission Extras
January 27 2004
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MARTIN & NELSON
A Professional Corporation

Loren D. Martin (2101)
Mail:
PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066: Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Mr. Harris

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West. Provo, Utah, 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS
Petitioner,
v.

BILL OF SALE OF:
ONE 1978 Sea Ray Boat

BONNIE HARRIS
Respondent.

Case No:
Judge:

STATE OF UTAH
County of Utah

95-44-02034DA
Ray M. Harding, Jr.

)
SS.
)

I, Garth Thurgood, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

Approximately eight (8) years ago I sold and transferred one 1978, 26 foot, Sea
Ray Motor Boat, serial number SERA0852A1077-260SDA758-8, including the
accompanying trailer, to Craig Jack Harris in exchange for $17,500.00.

2.

Craig informs me that neither the boat nor the trailer have been registered since
then.

3.

Neither Craig nor I recall any Bill or Sale or other transfer documents since then.

4.

I am informed that Craig needs a Bill of Sale. There being some question raised I
hereby transfer all right, title and interest in and to said boat and trailer to Craig
Harris, acknowledging receipt of $1,500.00.

5.

I am informed that the boat and trailer are presently in the possession of Bonnie
Harris and neither Craig nor I know the serial number, if any, of the trailer.

DATED this

5? day of June, 2000.
Garth Thurgood/^

Subscribed and Sworn to before me on the 2?

day of June, 2000.
Jotary Publi

I xkXwJ&J
>&\Cj]*>^

LSBQ^
L XmmSSmm
_

^2 ^ke °«*' w* win
WyCon*,T>is8k>n Expires
January 27.2004
^ S t H t e Of Utah

.
I
I

J. Grant Moody, U.S.B. #6282
Charles A. Schultz, U S B . #4760
Attorney for Bonnie K Harris
P.O. Box 564
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 530-5636

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.

:
:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION Re:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER
MATTERS

:
:

Civil No. 954402034 DA

:

Judge: Ray Harding, Jr.

—oooOooo—
COMES NOW, the Respondent and submits the following Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of her Motion to Strike the Motion
and Memorandum Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related Matters, filed
by the Petitioner.

STA TEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Beginning at the hearing on the property distribution between

the parties to this action this Court has consistently and continually
ruled and explained to the petitioner that the Respondent was given the
assets in this case and not the dollar value of those assets.
2.

In virtually every hearing before this Court subsequent to

the hearing on the property distribution, this Court has repeatedly
emphasized to the petitioner that the Respondent was awarded the assets
and not the dollar value of those assets.
3.

At the June 8, 2000 hearing on the order to show cause why

the petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for failure and
refusal to abide by a the amended supplemental decree of divorce
entered in this case, this Court again, explained to the petitioner and
to his counsel that the Respondent was awarded the assets and not the
dollar value of those assets.
4.

At the June 8, 2000 hearing on the order to show cause why

the petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for his failure
and refusal to abide by the supplemental decree of divorce, this Court
again, explained to the petitioner and to his counsel that any alleged
complaints the petitioner's brother and/or sons might have regarding
any property allegedly removed from the storage shed on Orchard Drive,
by the Respondent, could not be addressed by this Court in this
proceeding because the only parties to this action are the petitioner
and the Respondent.

The Court again explained to the petitioner and to

his counsel that if the brother and sons of the petitioner believed the
-2-

Respondent had taken personal property belonging to them from the shed
on Orchard Drive they would have to file a separate action to recover
any such property allegedly taken.
5.

At the June 8, 2000 hearing on the order to show cause why the

petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for his failure and
refusal to abide by the amended divorce decree filed in this case, the
petitioner presented to the Court documentary evidence and testimony
concerning the actual values of the assets she was awarded in the
supplemental decree of divorce.

The Court accepted the petitioner's

position on the value of the assets she was awarded in the supplemental
decree of divorce and again reiterated that the Respondent had been
awarded the assets and not the dollar value of those assets.
6.

The Court found the petitioner in contempt of Court at the

June 8, 2000 hearing, and again ordered the petitioner to sign all the
documents necessary to effectuate a transfer of the assets to the
Respondent within two weeks of the hearing in order to purge his
contempt.
1.

At the June 8, 2000 hearing the petitioner offered no

evidence or testimony to rebut the values of the assets established by
the Respondent.
8.

Subsequent to the June 8, 2000 hearing, the petitioner did

not file a rule 59 Motion or a rule 60 b. Motion.
9.

Now the petitioner has filed a Motion Re: Order To Show Cause
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And Other Related Matters, seeking once again to argue that the
Respondent was awarded the value of the assets and not the assets
themselves.
10.

In his Motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related

Matters the petitioner once again seeks to litigate the claims of his
brother and his sons in this divorce proceeding.
11.

The petitioner has filed a Motion Re: Order To Show Cause

And Other Related Matters, a Memorandum in support of Motion Re: Order
To Show Cause And Other Related Matters and a notice of hearing on
motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related Matters, but the
petitioner has never had an order to show cause issued relative to his
Motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related Matters or served any
order to show cause all the Respondent.

ARGUMENT
THE PETITIONER'S MOTION IS FACTUALLY, LEGALLY AND PROCEDURALLY
IMPROPER. THEREFORE, THE Respondent IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE PETITIONER'S
MOTION STRICKEN AND DISREGARDED BY THIS Court

POINT!
THE PETITIONER IS IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO RE-LITIGATE THE DISTRIBUTION
OF MARITAL ASSETS IN VIOLATION OF THIS Court's SUPPLEMENTAL AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDING THE ASSETS OF THE MARRIAGE TO THE
Respondent.
In the supplemental amended decree of divorce, entered in this
matter, this Court specifically awarded the marital assets to the
Respondent.

This Court has repeatedly and continually explained to
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both the petitioner and petitioner's counsel that the Respondent was
awarded the marital assets and not the dollar value of those assets.
The petitioner and his counsel, however, refuse to accept this
fact, they continue to assert that the Respondent was awarded only the
dollar value of the assets as specified on exhibit A to the
supplemental decree of divorce.

In spite of this Court's infinite

patience and repeated explanations for nearly a year, the petitioner
and his counsel are once again attempting to argue before this Court
that the Respondent was only awarded the dollar value of the assets
listed on Schedule

A of the supplemental decree of divorce and not the

assets themselves.
Surely by now, this Court's patience must be exhausted with
respect to this matter.

On no less than a half a dozen occasions this

Court has explained with exquisite detail to both the petitioner and
his counsel that the Respondent was awarded the marital assets listed
on Schedule

A of the supplemental decree divorce, and not the dollar

value of those assets.
This Court has explained numerous times to both the petitioner and
to the petitioner's counsel that the Respondent was awarded the marital
assets listed on Schedule A of the supplemental decree of divorce and
not the dollar value of those assets.

Therefore, the petitioner and

his counsel have no valid justification for filing a motion for order
to show cause with respect to those assets or the value of those
-5-

assets.

The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other

matters is factually defective, legally defective and procedurally
defective, with respect to any attempt to re-litigate the distribution
of the marital assets and/or their value.
The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other matters
seeking to re-litigate the distribution of marital assets and the value
of those assets is simply filed in bad faith without any basis in fact
or law and for the purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying and
increasing the cost of litigation to the Respondent.

Therefore, the

Respondent's motion to strike the petitioner's motion Re: order to show
cause and related matters must be granted as a matter of law.

PQINTII
THE PETITIONER IS IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO LITIGATE THE ALLEGED CLAIMS
OF THE PETITIONER'S BROTHER AND HIS SONS WHO ARE NOT PARTIES TO THIS
DIVORCE ACTION IN THIS CASE.
The petitioner and his counsel are again asking this Court to
litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's brother and his sons
with respect to personal property they claim was taken from the storage
shed on Orchard Drive by the Respondent.

This Court has repeatedly

explained to both the petitioner and his counsel that the petitioner's
brother and his sons are not parties to this action that this Court has
no jurisdiction over them and cannot decide alleged claims between them
and Respondent in this divorce case.
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The Court has also repeatedly and

exquisitely explained to both the petitioner and counsel that if the
petitioner's brother and his sons feel they have a cause of action
against the Respondent they must file a separate action against her.
However, in spite of these repeated admonitions and explanations from
the Court, the petitioner and his counsel have once again filed a
motion with this Court seeking to litigate the alleged claims of the
petitioner's and his sons in this case.
The petitioner's seeking to litigate the alleged claims of his
brother and his sons, in this divorce proceeding before this Court is
factually, legally and procedurally improper.

The petitioner has not

had the Respondent served with an order to show cause, therefore, he
cannot schedule a hearing on an order to show cause because no order to
show cause been issued or served.
The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other matters
seeking to litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's brother and
his sons is simply filed in bad faith without any basis in fact or law
and for the purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying and increasing the
cost of litigation to the Respondent.

Therefore, the Respondent's

motion to strike the petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and
related matters must be granted as a matter of law.

POINTIII
THE PETITIONER'S MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER MATTERS IS
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND IMPROPER.
-7-

Petitioner has filed a motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other
Related Matters, a Memorandum in support of that motion and notice of
hearing on the motion.

However, the petitioner has never had an order

to show cause issued or served on the Respondent.

Therefore, any

hearing on the motion Re: order to show cause and other related matters
is improper and procedural defective.
The petitioner and his attorney have never had an order to show
cause issued with respect to their Motion Re: Order To Show Cause And
Other Related Matters, because they know this Court would not issue an
order should show cause relative to matters that have already been
determined and litigated before this Court and relative to matters
which this Court has repeatedly told both petitioner and his counsel
that the Court will not hear.

If the petitioner desired this Court to

reconsider its order on the marital assets to the Respondent the
petitioner was required to either file a Rule 59 motion within 10 days
of the supplemental decree divorce and/or a rule 60 (b) motion within 90
days of entry of the supplemental decree of divorce.

The petitioner

did not do either of those options, therefore, he is procedural
estopped from attempting to do so at this time.
Likewise, if the petitioner disagreed with this Court's order on
the order to show cause of the petitioner for his failure and refusal
to comply with the supplemental decree of divorce, as announced by the
Court at the June 8, 2000 hearing, the petitioner had 10 days to file a
-8-

Rule 59 motion with respect to the order or 90 days to file a rule
60(b) motion with respect to that order.
to do neither of those things.

Again, the petitioner chose

Therefore, he is also estopped from

attempting to question the validity of the transfer of the assets to
the Respondent or to question the value of the assets transferred to
the Respondent.
Once again, the petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and
other matters seeking to re-litigate, a by way to of an order to show
cause that is never been granted or served, is filed in bad faith
without any basis in fact or law and for the purposes of harassing,
vexing, annoying, and increasing the cost of litigation to the
Respondent.

Therefore, the Respondent's Motion to Strike the

petitioner's Motion Re: order to show cause and related matters must be
granted as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other related
matters is factually, legally and procedurally defective.

The

petitioner is attempting to re-litigate property distribution set forth
in his supplemental decree of the divorce and to have this Court rule
that the Respondent was awarded the dollar value of the marital assets
and not the marital assets, as this Court has repeatedly stated.

The

petitioner is also attempting to litigate alleged claims of his brother
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and sons, who are not parties to this divorce action, in this case in
spite of this Court's repeated admonitions that the petitioners' sons
and brother are not parties to this case and Court has no jurisdiction
over them.

The petitioners also attempting to litigate and re-litigate

these matters under the guise of an order to show cause, when no such
order has ever been issued by this Court or served upon the Respondent.
The petitioners motion Re: order to show cause and other related
matters is filed for the purposes of vexing, annoying, harassing, and
increasing cost of litigation to the Respondent.

The petitioner has no

factual, legal or procedural grounds on which he can justify his motion
Re: ordered to show cause and other related matters.

Therefore, the

Respondent's motion to strike the petitioners motion Re: order to show
cause And other related matters must be granted as a matter of law, and
the Respondent should be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred
in filing this Motion and responding to the spurious Motion Re: Order
to Show Cause and Other Related Matters filed by the petitioner and his
counsel, in bad faith with no justification in fact or law.
Respectfully this submitted this ^

Day of December 2000.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney at Law
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

av of December I served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Motion and Memorandum to the persons
specified below by depositing a copy(s) in the United States Mail,
Postage Prepaid, addressed as follows:
Loren D. Martin
MARTIN & NELSON
139 South Temple, Suite 400
SLC, UT 84111

Charles Schultz
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MARTIN & NELSON. PC
Loren D.Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
v.

MOTION TO DISMISS and
OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE (Hearing Requested)

BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.

Case No: 95-44-02034 DA
Judge:
Ray M. Harding, Jr.

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Petitioner
files this MOTION TO DISMISS and OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
as follows: (Under the provisions of Rule 4-501 (3)(B), hearing is requested.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Respondent filed and mailed her MOTION TO STRIKE dated December 29,2000.

2.

Respondent's Motion made no request for hearing.

3.

Petitioner does not dispute that the Court ordered him to transfer the assets to

Respondent as listed on "Schedule A" of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce.
4.

Petitioner does assert that the division of property envisioned by the Court at trial

was the property as it was at that time, absent a windfall or unjust enrichment.
5.

The Court's Order on Contempt, Evidentiary Hearing, dated June of 2000, page 4,

at paragraph 7, required Petitioner to pay "post judgment interest" of $3,787.61. The clear intent
was to transfer all property as it existed at the date of judgment plus interest to the date paid.

6.

The record reflects that delay in transfer and final resolution of this matter has at

least in part been caused by Respondent's appeal of the order of the court that she herself prepared
for this Court's signature.
7.

Petitioner does contend that Respondent did violate the Orders of the Court in

several particulars by failing to provide required information, failure to cooperate in the transfer of
assets, taking property not included on "Schedule A,'" and by furnishing false or misleading
information to the Court as more specifically stated in the "Statement of Facts" set forth in
Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Mortion Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Related
Matters that was dated, filed and personally served on December 19, 2000. Said Memorandum is
hereby incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
Respondent's Motion to Strike does not meet the requirements of either the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
Rule 4-501 (1)(A) requires that:
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate affidavits, and copies of or
citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other
documents in support of the motion.
Respondent's Motion to Strike cites no points or authorities, provides no affidavits, and
provides no copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or
other documents.
Respondent's argument just makes an attempt to shift the issues or by inference to raise
other issues that will provide Respondent with a windfall or unjust receipt of value far in excess of
and not in compliance with the intent of the Court.

POINT 2
Respondent is not entitled to engage in dilatory conduct that caused delay of this matter by which
she then asserts a right to a windfall and unjust receipt of value in excess of the Court's orders.
Petitioner's Motion re: Contempt sets forth the nature of misrepresentations that have been
made to the Court by Respondent. As an example, the parties agreed and it was read into the
record that Respondent and Petitioner had reached an agreement as to division of personal
property.

That agreement was that Petitioner would pay $5,000.00 and retain his personal

property. Respondent repudiated that agreement after the trial. Respondent stands in contempt of
the orders of this court for the reasons specifically delineated and set forth in Petitioner's Motion
re: Contempt. Respondent's Motion to Strike does not meet the requirements of the Rules of Civil
Procedure or Rule 4-501 and should be disregarded as nothing more than an attempt to respond
improperly and confuse the issues addressed.
Respondent's Motion to Strike is an attempt to benefit from one's own misconduct. Such a
holding would encourage dilatory conduct and would encourage fraudulent activity, delay, and
misrepresentation. The taking of some needed "tools" does not justify the taking of everything.
That was not the agreement of the parties nor was it the order of this Court. The stipulation to the
possible need that Respondent expressed for some tools to maintain the yard was in plain
language. The parties cannot be deemed to have intended Respondent's taking of all property
when the plain language was to the contrary. See Wingets, Include, v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d
231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Steward, 4 Utah 2d 228,
291 P.2d 890 (1955) and Cummings v. Nelson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913).
Using reality as a frame of reference is especially appropriate in this case. Respondent's
dilatory and wrongful actions must not inure to her own benefit. The tort-feasor should not be
permitted benefit from their own conduct. "The law allows a plaintiff to maximize recovery and
thus prevent a converter from profiting from wrongful acts." See generally Alta Indus. Ltd.

v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Utah 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 926, at 538
(1979);DanB. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 5.15, at 414 (1973). The
courts do not have discretion to act in a capricious or arbitrary7 manner that may produce an
inequitable or unjust result. "The word "discretion'' itself imports that the action should be taken
with reason and in good conscience, and with an understanding of and consideration for the rights
of the parties, for the purpose of serving the always desired objective of doing justice between
them. Davis v. Riley, 437 P.2d 453 (Utah 1968).
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court dismiss the Respondent's Motion to Strike
for failure to comply with the rules or that the Motion to Strike be denied, and grant such other and
further relief as the Court deems just.
DATED: January JjJi,

2001.
MARTIN & NELSON, PC
Counsel for Petitioner
ren D. Martii;
Attorney at Law
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CERTIHCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 4 ^ T 2 0 0 1 , I placed in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, a copy of
the following documents:
1.

MOTION TO DISMISS, and OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
STRIKE (Hearing Requested)

addressed to the following:
J. Grant Moody
336 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003

Charles A. Schultz
P.O. Box 564
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
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J
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MARTIN &. NELSON. PC
Loren D.Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0590
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400
Sale Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073
Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
v.

PETITONER'S OBJECTION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
MOTION RE: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.

Case No: 95-44-02034 DA
Judge:
Ray M. Harding, Jr.

Petitioner, Craig Jack Harris, by and through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 4-501, files
this Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Strike Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and
Other Related Matters as follows:
ARGUMENT
Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for a Motion to Strike as follows:
Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the court may
order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
POINT 1
PETITIONER IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO RELITIGATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF
MARITAL ASSETS.
The Respondent is arguing that by the Petitioner filing his Motion Re: Order to Show
Cause and Other Related Matters, that Petitioner is somehow attempting to re-litigate the court's
1

distribution of the parties' marital assets. Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner is once
again seeking an order from the Court that the Respondent was awarded the dollar value of the
marital assets and not the actual asset.
Respondent has mischaracterized the substance of Petitioner's motion. The Petitioner is
not seeking an order from the Court that the Respondent was awarded the dollar value of the
marital assets and not the actual asset.
The Petitioner has accepted the fact that the trial court awarded the Respondent the actual
assets of the marital estate and not the dollar value of those assets. Petitioner is merely seeking to
enforce the Supplemental Decree of Divorce as ordered by the Court.
For example, according to the supplementary decree of divorce the Respondent was
awarded the Prudential IRA Account that had a "net value" of $2,666.00, and an account balance
as of January 29, 1999, the agreed upon valuation date, of $4,847.00. (See Supplementary
Decree of Divorce).
Therefore, what the Court awarded the Respondent was the actual asset as of the January
29, 1999, valuation date. On January 29, 1999, the asset had a value of $4,847.00. That is what
the Court ordered and that is what the Petitioner is seeking to enforce. If this is not what the Court
ordered then it begs the question - what does the January 29, 1999, valuation date mean?
What the Respondent actually received was an asset with a value of $20,748.33 which is
$15,901.33 more than the value of the asset as of the valuation date (i.e.$4,847.00) which is what
the Court ordered.
The Petitioner is not seeking to revisit the court's order, re-litigate the Court's order, or in
any way is the Petitioner asking the Court to reconsider its order. What the Petitioner is seeking to
do is enforce the Court's order.

2

POINT 2
PETITIONER IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO LITIGATE THE ALLEGED CLAIMS
OF HIS BROTHER AND SONS.
The Petitioner is not asking this Court to "litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's
brother's and his sons with respect to the personal property they claim was taken from the storage
shed on Orchard Drive by the Respondent." What the Petitioner is asking for is that the Court
enforce its order with respect to the personal property.
Subsequent to the trial there was disagreement between the parties on what the court
actually ordered with respect to the personal property. Respondent claimed that all of the
Petitioner's personal property, including the items in the storage shed was the Respondents.
Because of the disagreement the Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Other
Related Matters that was heard on March 1, 2000. During that hearing the court took a recess and
gave the parties an opportunity to try and settle the matter regarding the personal property.
The parties did reach a settlement that was read into the record by Mr. Moody, and which
in essence stated as follows:
On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take what personal tools that she would
like to have out of the shop by the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have
until that weekend, I believe its the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the
possessions out of the shop.
Subsequently, the Respondent claimed that the property was stolen which claim was a
fabrication. Because the property was not actually stolen but was removed from the storage unit
by the Respondent the Petitioner is merely asking that the Respondent pick-out what tools she
would like and return the remainder of the personal property to the Petitioner as agreed to in the
party's stipulation.

3

POINT 3
PETITIONER'S MOTION IS NOT PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND
IMPROPER BECAUSE PETITIONER IS PERMITTED TO FILE A MOTION FOR
AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO ENFORCE THE ORDERS OF THIS COURT.
§30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated, provides that court issuing the decree has continuing
jurisdiction over the parties divorce.
Petitioner has filed a motion for an order to show cause to enforce the terms of the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce which matter is properly before this Court. Procedurally, the
means by which a party can seek enforcement of the decree of divorce is by an "order to show
cause" or some similar petition. Merely because the Petitioner chose to bring this matter before the
court by way of an "order to show cause" does not make Petitioner's motion procedurally defective
and improper.
Respondent makes an issue of the fact that the Petitioner did not obtain an actual "order to
show cause" but rather filed his motion for an order to show cause and then sent out a notice of
hearing. However, an actual "order to show cause" becomes necessary only when one party is
seeking to compel another party to appear at the hearing. The benefit of an actual order to show
cause signed by the Court is that if the non-moving party does not appear at the hearing an arrest
warrant can be issued for contempt as provided for in §78-32-4 which states as follows:
When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court or judge a warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person charged to
answer, or, without a previous arrest, a warrant of commitment may, upon notice,
or upon an order to show cause, be granted; and no warrant of commitment can be
issued without such previous attachment to answer, or such notice or order to show
cause.
In this case an actual order to show cause was not necessary because the Respondent was
already going to be at the scheduled hearing. At the hearing held on October 23, 2000, the Court
stated that in addition to the Brad Townsend issue, it would also hear the Petitioner's issues
regarding accounting.
A

As a result Petitioner prepared his motion for an order to show cause and served that
document along with a Notice of Hearing upon Respondent's counsel. Unless Petitioner is
seeking to have the Respondent held in contempt for not appearing at the hearing it is sufficient if
such pleadings are served upon Respondent's counsel.
With respect to the Respondent's final arguments regarding Rule 59, Rule 60, or
Respondent's allegation that Petitioner is seeking to review, revisit, or re-examine the court's
order, Petitioner is not seeking any such remedy. Petitioner is merely seeking to enforce the
Court's order.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Respondent's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Motion for an Order to Show Cause
and other related matters should be denied and Petitioner's motion heard by the Court.

DATED January 19, 2001.
MARTIN & NELSON, PC

Nelson
Attorn
ftorney at Law
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of January 2001 I placed in the US Mail postage prepaid, a copy of the following documents:
1)
Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Strike Motion Re Onier to Show
Cause and Other Related Matters
addressed to the parties as follows:
J. Grant Moody
336 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003

Charles A. Schultz
P.O. Box 564
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062

Shauna Beatty
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Charles A. Schultz, USB. #4760
Attorney for Bonnie K Harris
P.O. Box 564
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 530-5636

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,.

:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO "PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO
: MOTION TO STRDXE MOTION Re:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER
: MATTERS

Petitioner,
BONNIE HARRIS,
Respondent.

:

C i v i l No. 954402034 DA

:

Judge: Ray Harding, J r .

—oooOooo—
COMES NOW, t h e Respondent and submits t h e f o l l o w i n g Memorandum of
P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s i n O p p o s i t i o n i t t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s O b j e c t i o n t o
R e s p o n d e n t ' s Motion t o S t r i k e Motion RE: Order To Show Cause And Other
Related Matters.

ARGUMENT
THE PETITIONER'S OBJECTION IS NOTHING MORE THAN A PATHETIC ATTEMPT TO
JUSTD7Y THE PETITIONER'S IMPROPER FILING OF HIS "MOTION RE: ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS" THAT WAS FTLED IN BAD FAITH, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH LAW, WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN FACT OR LAW AND IN
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE PURPOSE OF

HARASSING, VEXING,
LITIGATION TO HER

NNOYING THE RESPONDENT AND INCREASING THE COSTS OF

POINT I
CONTRARY TO THE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL'S ASSERTIONS, THE PETITIONER IS
ATTEMPTING TO RE-LITIGATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ASSETS.
In t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s O b j e c t i o n t o R e s p o n d e n t ' s Motion t o S t r i k e
Motion RE: Order t o Show Cause and Other R e l a t e d M a t t e r s

(hereinafter,

" P e t i t i o n e r ' s O b j e c t i o n " ) , t h e p e t i t i o n e r and h i s c o u n s e l claim t h a t
t h e y a r e not a t t e m p t i n g
assets.

> r e - l i t i g a t e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l

The p e t i t i o n e r and h i s c o u n s e l c l a i m "the petitioner has accepted the fact

that the trial court awarded the Respondem ///»• in \ual assets of itw ima tui csiitu ttmi nat tk1 tinllti? vnitu

of those assets." (Petitioner's objection, page 2, paragraph 3).

However, in

paragraphs 4 and 5 of petitioner's Objection, the petitioner and his
counsel argue that what the Respondent was awarded was not the actual
marital assets but the value of the marital assets at the time the
marital assets were awarded to the Respondent.
In paragraph 4, page 2, of petitioner's objection, the petitioner
and his counsel state:
For example, according to the supplemental decree oj divorce the Respondent was awarded the
Prudential IRA account that had a 'net value " of $2,666.00, and account balance as of January 29,
1999, the agreed-upon valuation date, of $4,847.00.

In paragraph 5, page 2, of petitioner's objection, the petitioner and
his counsel state:
Therefore, what the court awarded the Respondent was the actual assets as oj January 29, 1999,
valuation date. On January 29$ 1999 the asset had a value of $4,847.00. That is what the court ordered
-2-

and that is what the petitioner is seeking to enforce.

In petitioner's prayer for relief in his Motion RE: Order To Show Cause
And Other Related Matters, the petitioner prays for relief as follows:
F. $16,292.39 for overage taken from Craig fs Prudential IRA account;
G. $4,958.00 for overage taken from Craig's MONEY life account;
H. S3,787.61 excess interest assessed from January 26, 1999;

Out of one side of their mouths the petitioner and his counsel
claim that they have accepted the fact that this Court awarded the
Respondent the actual assets of the marital estate, and out of the
other side of their mouth's, the petitioner and his counsel claim that
the Court only awarded the Respondent the dollar value of the assets on
the valuation date and demand that the Respondent return the difference
between the actual value of the guesstimated value of the assets.

The

petitioner and his counsel cannot have it both ways. If the petitioner
in fact agrees that the Respondent was awarded the marital assets and
not the dollar value of the marital assets, then the petitioner and his
counsel cannot legitimately and honestly ask this Court to require the
Respondent to return to the petitioner any difference between the
actual value of the marital assets and the actual value of the
guesstimated value of those assets.
The value of the marital assets and awarded the Respondent was
litigated at the evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause why the
petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for his failure to
comply with the supplemental decree divorce.
-3-

In that hearing the

Respondent presented her evidence of the value of the marital assets
she was awarded and this Court accepted the Respondent's evidence, and
it again reiterated its holding that the Respondent was awarded the
assets of the marital estate and not the dollar value.

The Court then

found petitioner in contempt of Court, and ordered the petitioner to
sign all necessary documents to transfer the assets of the marital
estate to the Respondent with all moneys taken from any of the assets
return to those assets in order to purge his contempt.
The very issues the petitioner and his counsel are attempting to
re-litigate P, means of the petitioner'-. MMI.LOU Re: Order To Show Cause
And Other Related Matters, was fully and completely litigated at the
June 11, 2000 evidentiary hearing, and cannot the re-litigated again.

PQINTIl
CONTRARY TO THE PETITIONER'S AND HIS COUNSELS CLAIMS, IHE PETITIONER IS
IN FACT IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO LITIGATE THE ALLEGED CLAIMS OF THE
PETITIONER'S BROTHER, HIS SONS AND AH) EQUIPMENT IN THIS CASE.
Contrary, to the petitioner's and his counsel's claims, the
petitioner and his counsel are in fact again asking this Court to
litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's brother and his sons,
and even Aid Equipment with respect to property they claim was taken
from the storage shed on Orchard Drive by the Respondent.

In spite of

this Court repeatedly explaining to both the petitioner and his counsel
that the petitioner's brother and his sons are not parties to this
action that this Court has no jurisdiction over them and that this
-4-

Court cannot rule on any alleged claims between them and Respondent in
this divorce case, the petitioner and his counsel have again filed a
motion with this Court again asking it to award monetary damages to the
petitioner's brother and sons.
The petitioner's and his counsel's statements in petitioner's
objection that the petitioner is not asking this Court to litigate the
claims of his brother and his sons is a deliberate, willful and
fraudulent representation to this Court and is an insult to the
intelligence of this Court.
On page 21 of petitioner's Motion RE: Order To Show Cause And
Other Related Matters, in the petitioner's prayer for relief, the
petitioner praised as follows:
A. $23y000.00 for items missingfrom the storage building;
C. $2y 925.00 for A id Equipment property taken from storage building;
D. S3,734.00 for Dick Harris' property taken from storage building;
E. $8,600.00 for Troy and Scott Harris 'property taken from storage building;
If the petitioner and his counsel are not seeking to litigate the
alleged claims of the petitioner's brother his sons, Aid Equipment and
some other unknown entity in this divorce proceeding then why does the
petitioner's prayer for relief in petitioner's Motion Re: Order to Show
Cause And Other Related Matters ask this Court to award $2,925.00 to
Aid Equipment, $3,734.00 to Dick Harris and $8,600.00 to Troy and Scott
Harris and $23,000.00 to some unidentified entity?
The petitioner's and his counsel's assertion that the petitioner
-5-

is not asking this Court tc litigate the alleged claims of the
petitioner's brother, sons and Aid Equipment is the unbelievable
misrepresentation of fact to this Court.

POlNTm
CONTRARY TO THE PETITIONER'S AND HIS COUNSEL'S FALSE ASSERTIONS, THE
PETITIONER'S MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER MATTERS IS
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND IMPROPER
Petitioner has filed a motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other
Related Matters, a memorandum in support of that motion and a notice of
hearing on that motion.

However, the petitioner has never had an order

to show cause issued or served on the Respondent.

Therefore, the

Respondent is not subject to any order to show cause, and any hearing
on the Motion Re: Order to Show Cause Other Related Matters is improper
and procedural defective.

Contrary to the petitioner's and his

counsel's assertions a party cannot be subject to order to show cause
if no order to show cause has ever been issued or served.
The petitioner and his counsel admit that they have never had an
order to show cause issued with respect to their Motion Re: Order To
Show Cause And Other Related Matters. (Petitioner's Objection, page 4,
paragraph 3).

Nonetheless, the petitioner and his counsel claim that

the petitioner is entitled to the hearing on his Motion RE: Order To
Show Cause And Other Matters because it is not actually necessary to
have an order to show cause issued and served on the party who is
allegedly in violation of some order of the court in order to have a

hearing on the order show cause.

Such assertion is utter nonsense and

a deliberate misrepresentation of law on the part of the petitioner and
his counsel.
This Court has previously told the petitioner and his counsel that
it would not hear any matters concerning the Respondent's alleged
violation of any court orders unless and until an order to show cause
was issued by the court and served on the Respondent.
The petitioner and his counsel have not cited and cannot cite any
authority, statutory, procedural or case law that permits a party to
have a hearing on an order to show cause when no order to show cause
has ever been issued or served on the alleged offending party.

The

petitioner's and his counsel's representations that actual order show
cause was unnecessary in this case because the Respondent was already
going to be at a scheduled hearing is a deliberate misrepresentation of
the a law to this Court.

CONCLUSION
The petitioner's and his counsel's assertions that they are not
attempting to re-litigate the distribution of the marital assets is
deliberate, willful, knowing, and intentional misrepresentation of the
facts to this Court.

The petitioner's and his counsel's assertions

that they are not attempting to litigate the alleged claims of the
petitioner's brother, sons, Aid Equipment and some unspecified entity
in this case is yet another deliberate, willful, knowing, and
-7-

intentional misrepresentation of facts.

The petitioner's and his

counsel's assertions that the petitioner's Motion RE: Order Show Cause
And Other Related Matters is legally and procedurally proper is yet
another deliberate, willful, knowing, and intentional misrepresentation
of both the facts and the law.
The petitioner's Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Matters
as well as the petitioner's Objection was filed by the petitioner and
his counsel in bad faith without any basis in fact or Jaw and for the
purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying, and increasing the cost of
litigation to the Respondent.

See the affidavits of Jeanie Langston

and Bonnie Harris copies of which are attached to this Memorandum as
Exhibits 1 and 2.

Therefore, the petitioner's Motion Re: Order to Show

Cause and Related Matters as well as the petitioner's Objection should
be stricken and the Respondent should be awarded her Cause and
attorney's fees incurred in responding to the petitioner's Motion Re:
Order to Show Cause and Related Matters and Objection filed by the
petitioner and his counsel in bad faith without any basis in fact or
law and for the purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying, and increasing
the cost of litigation to the Respondent.
Respectfully this submitted this _

__ dav of January 2001.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney at Law
-8-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

January 2001 I served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum to the persons
specified below by depositing a copy in the United States Mail,Postage
Prepaid, addressed as follows:
Loren D. Martin
MARTIN & NELSON
139 South Temple, Suite 400
SLC, UT 84111

Charles Schultz

J Grant Moody, (6282)
J GRANT MOODY, P C
336 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003
Telephone (801)756-4181
Facsimile (801)756-3940
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COI K I' MM I AH .. ( H ' \ 1 >
STATE OF UTAH

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,

AFFIDAVr Of || \NNi I ^NGSTON

Petitioner,
BONNIE HARRIS

:

H e i|HtMi.lnn

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SEVERE

Civil Nu y*>44020j4 l.iA
•

Judge: Ray Harding, Jr

}
SS
}

Jeanne Langston, being duly t'n w iwu n de;>(Kc<, and vjir, a» liilmws:
I

I, Jeanne Langston, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. I am
competent to testify as to these matter". \u " "."iild u »(*,"'v l-a 11 *.! 1 .,)" 11

'"', *\ i

trial of this matter.
2.

On November ! 3, i vW. I was staying with Bonnie Mai - n in Pleasant
weekend.

3

Bonnie and I and another friend, Sharon Maxfield, were having breakfast at the K& V
w.t-ifaui *ni m Pleasant Grove that mon*.-r.£ '/pp-^w 9:30 -im or '0:0G Air; chen Craig
Hams (Bonrae's X-husba:jd) came in and sat down and started talking wi

4

Craig made the comment that he was going to go to the shed and pick up one of their four
wheelers to take out to the motor cycle race their grandson was in.

5.

Bonnie told Craig that she had the locks changed on the shed door and that she would
have to let him in.

6.

At that point Craig got extremely mad He stated he would break the door down

7

Bonnie said there was no reason for that, she would be glad to let him in, Craig made
more threats and then left the restaurant.

8.

Sharon and I were going shopping. Bonnie was going to the race track to watch her
grandson race. However, Bonnie did not want to be left alone with Craig when he came
to pick up the four wheeler, and she asked me to stay with her until he left.

9

Craig and his son Scot were not far behind us getting to Bonnie's house.

10

Craig said he had called Scot and told him to come and get his belongings out of the shed.

11

Bonnie and I walked over to the shed to let Scot and Craig in.

12.

Craig and Scot were mad, both Scot and Craig were extremely rude and ignorant in their
talk and actions toward Bonnie.

13.

All that Bonnie said to them was. "I am not going to fight with any of you," "1 have video
taped everything in the shed, I have proof of what was in here, and we will have to let the
Judge make another decision." Then Bonnie and 1 went back to her home

14.

We had not been there five minutes when Craig came to the door, Craig offered Bonnie
$5,500 for his personal belonging and the reloading equipment.

15.

Bonnie said she felt it was worth more, that he had under evaluated everything. Craig
was yelling and screaming threats at Bonnie, Craig ieft and returned a few minutes later
with a different proposal $60,000 and he wouldn't mortgage the house that the Judge

gave to Bonnie.
Ijuniic KL.J -Nil1- *• ii i Mjt join-; i.) take his offer it was less than what the Judge had
awarded her
17.

Craig was i ral nuinl ui J hr ivudc .norr ihieais

Craig stated that if Bonnie did not take his

offer he would keep fighting her in court until she used up all the money awarded to her.
He said -

<

tin * I i n

'

lltt

18

After about Vi hour of his demands he left, because Bonnie would not give in and agree

19

Bonnie repeatedly stated that she was not going to go agai/i ist the Judges decision.

20.

After Craig wrn? back to !f.c shed, Bonnie cal'H Mr. Moody, her ^tt^tney, and asked
what she should do They ciscussed ai! thai had happened

Mr. Moody aavised Bonnie

to stay completely away from the shed until Cr«i? and Scot had left.
At approx. 12:30 PM. Bonrac *aid sfr: u a.i,
22

As

>\IK

zrd ! s»* Ouid go *'ith

SAIU/CI!.

•

{[ e f| Bonnie's home, I could see Craig and Scot were still loading things into Scot's

UMzk •:*] ^arj hooked * toat onto Scot's truc«c.
23.

I w.'fr\ JJ;.. nif" iiinil! 'I'lff afternoon (6:00 PM) and when I went back to Bonnie's she told me
of sn .rr^-Jerit thrt had kippuwi

24

Hi unit-

HI AK

« t h e rac? *rack.

ui IIIIIII snr lynl mt c i tundmtt lit or 40 feet from Craig when Kara Hams, who

is Scot's %*ife wiled up to the race track
sic suned " eiliiiii in i,

IUIIJ

5?h* did not ?cs Bonn:-s .-trKung there when

I mil i( I yMii in ) A\ci I'livr

SM'&I II

T

IIIJUI

Snrruwrri

IT

1 Aid

what you said and it worked I got in." Bonnie said tha* Craig had run >o *he truck telling

25

That same evening, Bonnie Bho let me hear Scot's message that he had left on her
a/is-vering i *a- hu ic... *> ::i slii :es aft** 8oi:w: "iad .ii> ! ;ec ..p the : hec ar d ha; : teft foi: t:l" e •

race he broke into the building to get his and Kara's Vft bikesf and that he had removed
the devices Bonnie had pat in (he door and put the door lever to keep the door from
opening
26.

The next day Bonnie, Ben McKinncy and I wa'ked over to the shed We took long bolts
and put two in each door lever, one on each side of the main beam and bolted them to the
doors so that nobody would be shle to move or slide the lever and get into the shed The
doors were bolted shut at that time.

27

Upon examining the main door, it was our beiief that it would be impossible to ever get it
open using a credit card, it was tightly secured We left the building believing everything
was secure

Dated this

I i

dav of

7*lobwb

.2000.

~i

/Jeanne Langston

'*'

:/

Subscribed and Sworn to this <^T

/

Notary Public

urn-'

day of

$X+f~\s

, 2000.

STATE OF UTAH

}
.ss
COUNTY OF UTAH }

Bonnie Harris being first sworn on her oath, deposes and states as follows:
I

I, Bonnie Harris, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit

2. On November 13,1999 I was having breakfast with two of myfriendsJeanie
Langston and Sharon Maxfield. We were eating at K&V Restaurant in Pleasant Grove, when
Craig Harris came and started talking to us
3 Craig said he was going to the shed on Orchard Drive to get some things, including
one of our four wheelers.
4 I told Craig that I had changed the locks on the shed so he could not get in. Craig got
very hostile and obnoxious
he would bn*ak down the door
5 i toid him ttat there was no need to do tnat because I would let luiri in ihe shed.
6. Who** Jeanie and 1 g^r back to my bou?e, Crag c*l'erj and s?iri he caUed his son Scot
and told him to get his stuff out of the shed
7. Je^jiie and I walked ovei to the bUcd to let Craig and Scoti *nto the jfced.
8. Craig anc Scot were very rude and obnoxious and Jeanie and 1 left and went back to
my house.
9 Crsig came hscV. to ^he horse ;bout f.ve minute? Jater ami ^ffereJ o ••?' 35,500.00 for
his personal property and reloading equipment.
! 0 i to'cJ Gaig thai me reloading equipment was worth more than tnat and that he had
undervalued e*f ry'hin^.
11. Craig was veiling and screaming at me and making all sorts of threats.
12. A lev* minuces later, Craig re^mec and ct&red mc $60,000 GO for everything and
said that he would not mortgage the house if I &:i>:pted $t 0,000.00.
13 I toid Craig that I would not accept his offer and that I was o^ly wing to accept what

14 Craig got even more angry and made more threats, and he told me that if I did not
accept his offer he would keepfightingme in court until I spent everything in attorney's fees and
that I would end up with nothing He said he had plenty of money to pay his attorney but that I
would have to spend everything the court gave me on attorney's fees to fight him

Dated this

-5

day of January 200 i.

Bonnie K. Harris

&£ day of January 2001

Sworn and subscribed to thi:
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTLCQUEI
D
P
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
RULING
v.
BONNIE HARRIS,

Case No. 954402034
Respondent.

Judge Ray M. Harding

This matter comes before the Court on the Petitioner's Order to Show Cause and
Respondent's Motion to Strike. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the parties'
memoranda, heard oral arguments, and being fully advised in the premises issues the following:
RULING
The Court notes that some of the claims raised in Petitioner's Order to Show Cause are
spurious and will be dealt with summarily. Petitioner would only be entitled to his own personal
property kept in the storage unit (shop) in question. Yet, in addition to a claim for $4,600.00 for
his own personal property, Petitioner prays for $23,000.00 of "items 'missing'" and for several
thousand dollars for property alleged to belong to third parties. Petitioner has no standing to
claim recovery for items belonging to relatives. Respondent is correct in asserting that affected
individuals or business entities would have to file their own claims.
Petitioner also makes claims against the IRA accounts awarded Respondent. The
Supplementary Decree of Divorce stated,
The property should be valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered
being January 26, 1999.

V

Petitioner cannot recover the difference in value between the time Respondent actually received
the asset awarded and the value on January 26, 1999. Petitioner attacks the Order on Contempt
Evidentiary Hearing stating that some of what Respondent was awarded came from separate
retirement accounts set up after the divorce. Sentencing on Contempt was June 21, 2000. The
Order regarding Contempt was filed July 17, 2000. Petitioner's position is not well taken. The
time to attack that Order under Rules 59 and 60(b)(l)-(3) has passed. Petitioner's Order to Show
Cause was filed over five months after the July Order. The Court notes that even had a proper
challenge been filed, it would likely have failed.
Petitioner makes fairness claims to seek recovery of part of the value of the life insurance
policy and the retirement accounts. Petitioner's claim is really one of equity. Neither party comes
before the Court with clean hands. Petitioner has been found to be in contempt. The Court
declines to alter the awards as they stand based on equity.
Each side has attacked the other's Motion for procedural flaws. As neither side has
strictly complied with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Judicial Administration,
the Court will not decide the matter solely on procedural grounds.
The most troubling allegation the Court must deal with is the allegation that Petitioner did
not receive items of his own personal property awarded by the stipulated agreement. The shop
was awarded to Respondent. Some of its contents and other items of personal property were in
dispute. The parties' stipulation March 1, 2000 as to disputed personal property stated,
On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take what personal tools that she would
like to have out of the shop by the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will
have until that weekend, I believe it's the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the
possessions out of the shop. . . . And then he will agree to pay $5000.00 for the
personal property and he retains possession of all the personal property.
The Order signed by the Court and filed on April 4, 2000, states,
The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15, 2000 to
select and remove what personal property she desires to have from the building
located on the Pleasant Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the remaining
personal property he desires out of the building on or before March 30, 2000. Any
Ruling Page 2

personal property left in the building after March 30, 2000 shall be the property of
the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the Respondent on or
before April 4, 2000, for the personal property located in his personal possession
andfromthe personal property received from the building located on the Pleasant
Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot to the
Petitioner from March 16, through March 30, 2000 upon the Petitioner giving
Respondent 24 hour notice of the times in which he intends on removing the
property.
The language of the Order is very broad. Petitioner has failed to provide the Court with
sufficient information to find that the Respondent did not comply with the Order. Specifically,
the Court did not have before it a list of specific items from the shop belonging to Petitioner still
in the possession of the Respondent and their values. Nor did Petitioner show that Respondent
lacked the discretion under the Order to hold those items back. Petitioner did not desire another
evidentiary hearing. The Court agrees that another hearing would befruitlessabsent a limit to
Respondent's discretion under the Order.
The Court will not at this late date revalue the assets or reassess distribution. The Court
notes the plethora of Orders it has had to enter since the initial Decree of Divorce. It is time to
bring finality. Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted as to all matters except for claims for the
Personal Property from the shed. Those personal property claims were not subject to a motion to
strike, but failed after oral arguments. Therefore, Petitioner's Order to Show Cause is denied and
Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows:

1. Respondent's Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
2. Petitioner's Order to Show Cause is DENIED.
3. Attorney fees are DENIED.
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4. Counsel for Respondent shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this
ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the
Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration,
lis / / day bf
of February, 2001.
DATED this

T>..I:..~ n«~~

A

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of February, 2001, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following,
with postage prepaid thereon.

Charles A. Schultz, PO Box 564, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Mark K. Nelson, PO Box 11590, Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0590

sptity Court C l e r k
Deputy

Charles A. Schultz, USB. #4760
Attorney for Bonnie K Harris
P.O. Box 564
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801)530-5636

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oooOooo—

ORDER ON "PETITIONER'S MOTION REORDER TO SHOW CA USE AND OTHER
MA ITERS AND RESPONDENTS MOTION
TO STRIKE MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW
CA USE AND OTHER MA ITERS

CRAIG JACK HARRIS,
Petitioner,
BONNIE HARRIS,

C i v i l No. 954402034 DA

Respondent.

Judge: Ray Harding,

Jr.

—oooOooo—
The Respondent's Motion to Strike the petitioner's Motion Re Order
to Show Cause and Other Related Matters and the petitioner's Motion Re
Order to Show Cause and Other Related Matters came on for regularly
scheduled hearing on February 14, 2001 at the hour of 9:30 a.m.

The

petitioner was represented by Mark Nelson, the Respondent was
represented by Charles Schultz.
The Court having heard and considered the oral arguments of the

parties, having read and considered the memoranda and exhibits filed by
the parties, having reviewed the file in this matter and now being
fully advised in the premises, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees as
follows:
1.

The Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted as to all matters

except for the Personal Property from the shed.
2.

The petitioner's Order to Show Cause is denied with respect

to the petitioner's claims to the personal property, all other claims
having been stricken.
3.

Attorney's fees are denied.

Dated this / /

day of March 2001.
BY THE COURT:

-; ^ Q . J

NOTICE TO PETITIONER AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the
Respondent will submit the forgoing Order to the Court for signature, upon the expiration offivedays
from the date this Notice is mailed to you, allowing 3 days for service by mail and intervening holidays,
unless a written objection isfiledwith the Court and served upon the Respondent's counsel prior to that
time.
Dated this £ [ _ day of February 2001.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF'SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <s L

day of February I served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to the person(s) specified
below by depositing a copy(s) in the United States Mail, Postage
Prepaid, addressed as follows:
Loren D. Martin
MARTIN & NELSON
139 South Temple, Suite 400
SLC,

UT

84111

Charles Schultz

